and Europe and the quest for connectivity. It's really wonderful to be here in Europe again and to be together with friends, old and new. I know that it's sometimes hard to get a person from Australia to come to Europe or vice versa and many people will tell you it's a long way to go but I disagree. I think that Australia and Europe are very, very close

in fact and as Dr. Versick knows very well, I'm drawn here because I've devoted much of my professional life to trying to understand the relationship between Asia and Europe and to promote those relations or at least have a better understanding of the impact

of European and Asian relations on international affairs. Since the 1980s, I've lived and worked in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific for nearly 20 years, including in France and in Switzerland, in Sweden, in China, in Taiwan and now for almost seven years in Australia.

But as an American by birth, this has really allowed me I think a, I hope a more worldly perspective and one that has seen remarkable changes over the past 30 or 40 years. Most of it encouraging but I have to say in more recent years, increasingly discouraging I'm afraid

and it affects all of us to this day and for the future and it's those changes that I wanted to try and talk about and how I perceive them as being important for Europe and for Asia and I was trying to try to consider those this morning. As Sebastian already said, it's particularly poignant

that we sit here today in Germany in the year 2019. It was 30 years ago, almost to the day, that the former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang passed away, sparking an outpouring of sympathy in Tiananmen Square which quickly morphed into a massive protest

demanding accountability and an end to corruption, increased employment opportunities for some and of course generally greater political openness. At their height 30 years ago in May 1989, that outpouring drew more than a million persons to Tiananmen Square alone and millions more,

let's not forget, in protests all across the country. Unfortunately, that people's movement was tragically suppressed by a small group of elderly men who ordered the army to respond, resulting in the killing of hundreds and possibly thousands of citizens

in Beijing and elsewhere across China. I lived in China in the mid 1980s and witnessed the early pro-democracy demonstrations which broke out in late 1986 which led to Hu Yaobang's ouster actually from the party. These were a precursor to the Tiananmen movement

which followed his death two years later. My Chinese colleagues and friends and students were shocked and despondent following the tragic events of June 1989 as was much of the world. And of course China has never been the same since. And as Dr. Bersek already noted, it was 30 years ago as well

that a more hopeful development occurred and that was the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989, marking the end of Soviet empire, the reunification of Germany and the beginnings of a Europe, whole and free. Living in Europe at the time in 1989, I came to Berlin and joined in the revelry

at Brandenburg Gate, excited about the new and united Europe to come. I note these historic milestones, one in Asia and one in Europe that I personally was able to experience simply as a way to highlight what I see as four broad trends, two older and two more recent,

the antecedents of which we can trace back to those remarkable days of 1989 and trends which we are still wrestling with to this day. Those trends set in motion in many ways by the upheavals of 1989 have come together now, have converged in a way that create this very complex

and uncertain mix of connectivity and contestation that we face today. The two longer term trends that have been in motion since 1989 have been first, globalization and the spread of democratic ideals and second, the rise of Asia

and particularly East Asia and China to become today the center of gravity in economic, diplomatic and security affairs. Now let's look at those first two trends and I'll consider the two more recent ones in a moment. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, of course, came tremendous and largely positive changes to the global order. It foretold the end of the 40 year Cold War

and the division of Europe. It foretold the end of the Soviet Union and its authoritarian empire across Eurasia and it opened the door to the spread of liberal values, democratic institutions, the rule of law, civil liberties, fair and open economies, respect for human rights as the basis for stable and prosperous societies.

It spread to Central and Eastern Europe and to Eurasia and beyond. According to Freedom House, a US based think tank and research institution, in 1989 more countries were identified as not free than those that were identified as free, 62 to 61

and 44 countries at the time were rated as partly free. By 2012, countries rated as free were nearly double those that were rated as not free, 90 to 47 while the number of countries rated partly free

remained relatively steady over that period. The breakdown of the Cold War order also helped unleash the forces of globalization and ideological blocks melted away, borders opened, societies prospered, global GDP soared between 1990 and 2010. Looking at world bank figures, global GDP more than tripled between 1989 and 2008

from 20 trillion US dollars to more than 63 trillion US dollars. The global trade openness index which measures the value of total global trade, imports plus exports, as a share of GDP nearly doubled over this period

from 36% to 62%. And meanwhile, and again, according to the World Bank, the percentage of persons in the world living in extreme poverty, defined as less than $1.90 a day, plummeted over this period from 37% in 1990 to less than 10% today.

And of course, this figure includes hundreds of millions of Chinese who immensely benefited from the post Cold War globalization wave. These are crude measurements but they're nevertheless indicative of this remarkable change in democratization and globalization

which has taken place since 30 years ago. And for Europe, for Europe, these changes were especially dramatic. In 1989, the European community numbered just 12 member states with a collective GDP of about 6.1 trillion. Today, the union of course has grown to 28 members

and that growth has been mostly from the former Soviet bloc and former Republic of Yugoslavia. With a collective GDP today, three times that of 1989 at about $18 trillion. The US has a single internal market, a common currency amongst 18 of its members

and accounts for nearly a quarter, nearly a quarter of global GDP. And of course, European countries today are ranked at the very, very top of the globalization indices out there. The KOF Globalization Index, for example, which uses economic, social and political indicators to measure the extent with which a country is integrated in the world.

Using that measurement, the Schengen countries hold 29 of the top 35 spots on the Globalization Index and 15 of the top 15. So the 15 countries rated as the most globalized are all European Schengen countries.

So in spite of its many ongoing challenges, the EU, which let's not forget, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for advancing reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe. In spite of its challenges, the EU stands at the very forefront of globalization and democratization trends

which kicked off in 1989. And as it should, continues to be a vanguard for those principles of globalization and democratization today. Let's turn to the second major trend, the rise of China and more broadly Asia since 1989.

Seeking to break out of their isolation in the wake of the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, Chinese leaders primarily led by Deng Xiaoping in his later years, returned to the path of reform and opening, Gai Ge, Kai Fang in the early 1990s. And unleashing the ingenuity

and the drive of the Chinese people not only helped to drive globalization and global economic growth for the next quarter century but powered China itself to the globally leading position it holds today. By some measures, we know China is the world's largest economy, overtaking the United States

and purchasing power parity terms in 2013. It's the world's largest exporter, the largest consumer of electricity, the number one emitter of greenhouse gases. It has the most cell phone subscriptions and internet users. It imports the second largest amount of crude oil. It has the second largest military budget. It's the second largest contributor to the United Nations

and to UN peacekeeping operations and boasts seven of the 10 largest container ports in the world. Over this remarkable period of 1989 to today, China has doubled its globalization index and of course it's become so much more integrated

with the globe economically, politically and socially. And in so many ways, these 30 years have transformed not only China but have transformed the global dynamic of economic, political and military power. Asia as a whole and especially East Asia and the Pacific has also enormously benefited over this period with the region's GDP quadrupling in current dollars

from six to 24 trillion dollars. Australia, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea and Thailand rank highest in the region today in terms of its globalization and integration all with rankings actually above that of China.

And interestingly over the past five years, it's the Asia Pacific region according to Freedom House which has made the most gains in terms of political rights and civil liberties in spite of the retrogression that we see in China. And throughout all of this, the EU, China and Asia have enormously benefited

especially economically over the course of these past 30 years. Having deepened their trade and their investment relationships, engaged closely on a range of regional and global issues and institutionalized partnerships like the Asia Europe meeting, EU membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum, EU strategic partnerships with countries like China,

India, Japan and South Korea and free trade agreements and other formalized economic arrangements between Europe and Asian partners such as the one that entered into force just two months ago, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. So by and large, these two longer term trends,

globalization and democratization on the one hand and the rise of China and East Asia on the other have been benefits. They've been largely positive and important foundations for growth, relative stability and of course the connectedness

that we see between the EU, China and the wider Asian region. I think we should take that as a remarkable set of accomplishments and largely as good news. That's the good news. Now I need to turn to less encouraging news, two other important but more recent trends

that we've seen over the past 10 to 15 years. Interestingly and disturbingly, these trends have arisen out of those first two trends but they increasingly challenged them now and threatened to undermine

the positive aspects of globalization, the positive aspects of the liberal rules-based order and the positive aspects of the rise of China and Asia. What are they? Well of course the first is the,

I would say resilience and resurgence of nationalist and authoritarian governance. China of course stands out in this regard but it's not the only example. Elsewhere around the world we see this trend of less liberal, less open, less democratic regimes gaining in strength and in numbers.

The most recent analysis again by Freedom House in 2019 sees democracy in retreat as for the 13th year in a row according to their measurements there has been a global decline in civil liberties and political rights. Not only in places like China and Russia

but even in democracies like the United States as well as in countries in Europe such as Hungary and in Poland. This development is very much related to one of the earlier longer term trends I noted, the rise of China. The most interesting aspect of this trend is not that China has not democratized.

The widespread narrative that experts in the democratic world expected such an outcome is erroneous, is wrong. Any person who understands China and its history and its current trajectory

I think would be very unlikely to believe that the country would democratize in the same way other communist authoritarian governments have done in Europe for example. At best over the past 30 years we could have hoped, could have hoped that China would become more open,

more just over time. Instead what is most interesting and challenging is that China has actually strengthened its authoritarian system, grown in comprehensive national power and begun to promote its political and economic system as a legitimate alternative to others

including the liberal order. This, this is an entirely unfamiliar and uncomfortable circumstance accustomed as the liberal order has been to the weakness and failures of authoritarian regimes especially with the fall of communism

in Europe and in Russia. China and other hopefuls of the illiberal persuasion seem to have realized what Russia's foreign minister identified as real competition, real competition in the marketplace of ideas that the liberal order has lost its monopoly

on the desired outcomes of globalization. Perhaps most importantly in all of this we need to recall that the central motivation of this approach by China, indeed nearly the motivation of all aspects of Chinese domestic and foreign policy is to ensure the survival and the legitimation

of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. We should not lose sight of that. As the recent excellent report on China from the British Parliament makes clear, and I've not seen another major liberal legislative body undertake such a serious and insightful effort,

so I congratulate them. I'm quoting here. They say, protecting core interests is what all states try to do in foreign policy, but what makes China different is that those interests are inextricably linked with the interests and perceived legitimacy of the Communist Party. That's critical. This unavoidably creates, not quoting now, that's unquote,

this unavoidably creates conflicts of interest and values then between China, the EU, and the broader liberal democratic world, not only with regard to how China's domestic house is ordered, but how China and other illiberal regimes wish to see the international order ordered.

And we can only expect this tension to grow going forward. And of course this is not only related to China. As authoritarian and nationalist resilience and resurgence gathers momentum in other countries, whether it's in Russia, in Central Asia, within Europe, and yes, even within the United States,

this trend directly contests the core values and interests of the European Union and the successes of globalization and democratization those values and interests have achieved. It's a challenge of the most fundamental order for the European Union and its proclaimed objectives

of introducing and promoting the European way to other parts of the globe, including across Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. As the British Parliament study concluded, China is a force for order, but not illiberal order.

This conclusion, with which I heartily agree, should be of great concern to the leaders and citizens of the European Union. That brings us then to the fourth major trend related to the previous three, and which has also become more evident in recent years.

This trend, like the others, has enormous impacts on the European Union. And like the resilience and resurgence of nationalist and authoritarian regimes, threatens the EU's values and interests, indeed the values and interests of the entire liberal order. This challenge is, of course, the decline of the post-war global order,

and the decline of support from its strongest advocate, the United States. To begin, we should not simply pin blame on the current resident of the White House, though he has no doubt exacerbated this trend. In many ways, an over-exuberance, you could almost say a uniquely American

optimistic exuberance in what the neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer, once called the unipolar moment, has driven, and still drives, I think, US leaders over 30 years into today to strategically overreach overseas

while strategically underreaching at home. This has led over time to an erosion in American support for its traditional global leadership role, while also undermining US homeland resilience and strength. The other three trends we've discussed have also had a role in this.

Globalization has disenfranchised many in the United States and catalyzed a backlash towards international engagement. China's rise generates a defensive protectionist pushback inside the United States. And many American citizens, like their counterparts in other parts of the developed world, see a nationalist us-first response

as the best way to reverse those perceived trends to their identity and livelihoods. But while there are still debates about the root causes of this trend, many of the outcomes are very, very clear. The United States, traditionally the leader

of the post-war international liberal rules-based order, is abdicating that role from strategically flawed defiance of international law under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to leading from behind under Barack Obama. US post-Cold War foreign policy

has frequently been at odds with the interests of European governments. And since 2017, the US president has only exacerbated these divisions while also intently focusing on dismantling the post-Cold War order which the European Union helped build

and on which it has thrived. Criticizing like-minded allies, questioning the value of those relationships, encouraging Brexit and other nationalist movements in Europe, expressing support for authoritarian regimes, and erecting barriers to the outside world, whether to trade, to immigration,

or to international agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Climate Change Accord, or the Iran nuclear deal. The negative impact on global governance and the rules-based order is becoming unfortunately increasingly clear and has left an opening for those other key trends such as the rise of China

and the resurgence of authoritarian and nationalist governments to exploit. And it's clear they are certainly trying to exploit these divisions. In many ways, all of this leaves the EU and some of its leading members alone in the world,

very alone, alone to pursue their values and interests in the world that has been changing, mostly in its favor for the past 30 years, but more recently increasingly against it. So taking these four trends of the past 30 years

into account, it's clear the European Union is facing some of its most serious challenges since its founding. The positive trends of globalization and democratization appear to have plateaued. While interconnectedness, interdependency,

and the dominance of liberal political systems remain facts of international geopolitical life, they seem to have lost some of their political appeal. This is especially true in the wake of the global financial crisis and the turmoil and retrogression which has characterized European politics

over the past decade. Has this trend run its course, at least for the time being? And if so, what does this mean for the European Union? Depending, as it has, on the principles of globalization and democratization at its very foundation,

its very raison d'etre in both internal and external policies. The rise of China has been by and large a great benefit to the European Union and its member states and vice versa. China's the number one source of imports for the European Union and the EU's second largest export destination.

Chinese investment in the EU has surged in recent years from 1.6 billion euros in 2010 to a record 35 billion euros in 2016. And if you count Hong Kong as a source of Chinese investment, that number triples to 115 billion euros.

So clearly, beneficial relationships. But China's growing power and influence have also brought now new risks and unwelcome developments across security, economic, and political arenas. We noted the recent EU strategy document, which identifies China as a strategic rival on governance questions.

But these views have been building for some time. It's not something new. More than a year ago, German Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, warned that China was, quote, "'constantly trying to test and undermine the unity "'of the European Union "'through policies of sticks and carrots.'" And he argued that the Belt and Road Initiative specifically aims to promote a system of values

that is different from the West. In January this year, a report by the Federal Association of German Business, the BDI, labeled China a systematic competitor. And we should note that one of the authors of that report is here with us today.

More recently, last month, the President of France declared that Europe had brought an end to its naivete towards China. The EU and some of its member states have begun to place greater scrutiny on Chinese investments on national security grounds. Some have argued that even more needs to be done.

Former Danish Foreign Minister and the General Secretary of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, recently argued for tighter EU-wide regulations to govern Chinese investment so that Chinese entities cannot exploit the weaker regulatory systems and foreign investment review mechanisms of some European countries in order to gain access

to potentially sensitive technologies. The EU is not alone in facing these particular challenges from China, but I would say it's been slower than most democratic institutions to respond to them. Of course, a part of the problem lies in the division within the EU and within EU member states about how to respond.

And of course, Beijing is working very hard to exploit those divisions. But we have to acknowledge that owing to China's growing reach, the nature of EU-China relations is moving towards one of what I've called bounded engagement. Greater skepticism, greater caution, greater scrutiny,

narrowing the parameters of the possible in many areas and a greater sense of competition arising, especially in terms of security economics and yes, political ideas. China's rise is also a part of the third trend we discussed,

the resilience and resurgence of authoritarianism. We appear to be entering a new phase of competition with China in addition to economic competition and competition in military modernization. Today, under Xi Jinping, in a 21st century battle for hearts and minds,

China is investing powerful resources to compete in the realm of ideas and political influence in an effort to legitimize the Chinese Communist Party and China's economic and socio-political model. In addition, the EU faces a more immediate threat

from Russia which seeks to undermine democratic processes in Europe while promoting anti-EU and other nationalist parties. And we see within the EU itself growing popularity for such movements and political parties. This is not merely a question of domestic governance

in countries like Hungary or in Italy. It threatens the very existence of the European Union. In his recent article about the return of geopolitics and the German question to Europe, Bob Kagan writes that all around Germany, the viability of the European Union is in question.

To the east, illiberalism and authoritarianism in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia. To the south, Italy, governed by a nationalist and populist parties with a questionable commitment to the European Union.

To the west, he sees France just one election away from a nationalist electoral victory which would be of enormous consequence. And to the north, the victory of nationalist populism which is Brexit. Even in Germany, the AFP, the Alternative for Deutschland

is the third largest party in the Bundestag. And all that then brings us to draw conclusions on the fourth trend and the future of liberalism itself especially in light of an America apparently less and less willing to stand up for the ideal and the international system it built to defend it.

Across the globe, we see a shift in the balance of power between liberalism and illiberalism. And the EU is at the very heart of that struggle. We should not doubt that the liberal order which the EU and most of its members represent

and on which they depend is under serious assault. It is not simply that antagonistic alternatives whether it's in the Beltway or in Budapest or in Beijing are putting pressures on Brussels. It's bigger than that. The very ideas of open borders, open societies,

multilateral rules-based orders are coming under fire. Looking ahead, what does all this tell us about the European Union and Asia in a changing global environment? The topics we're supposed to be addressing here. First, I think we have to seriously understand

that the EU is under enormous pressure externally and internally. Advocates of the liberal international order should be deeply concerned and we all need to do what we can to prioritize our support and engagement of the European Union in whatever ways possible.

But of course, it's going to be largely up to the EU to step up to these geopolitical realities, drive consensus internally about how to respond to these realities and develop a more cohesive and compelling narrative and set of policies to ensure that the European way can thrive

and survive for decades ahead. In this context then, the EU strategy to deepen its connectivity with Asia certainly makes sense and I think it's a step in the right direction if it is properly resourced

and sustained, it is not just rhetoric. It provides a platform by which the European way of fair, fiscally sound and sustainable development can be promoted. It could be an avenue to engage and compete with China on a more level playing field and thereby hope to encourage more positive approaches

from Beijing while also deepening and diversifying European relations with other rising Asian nations. Increased European engagement in the region, especially in coordination with other like-minded partners could help sustain momentum in much of the region

in favor of free trade, expanded civil liberties, accountable governance, the rule of law and the liberal-based order. And a greater EU presence in Asia will be welcomed by many in the region who are seeking compatible partners as alternatives to what has become an uncertain

and unpredictable America. So in sum, there are many powerful reasons for the EU and Asia to deepen their strategic engagement and connectivity precisely because it can be a bulwark against the very difficult challenges

the Union and the world now face. The big question is though, is the EU up to this task? Can it be done? I'll conclude simply by saying for the sake

of the international liberal order, I surely hope so. Thank you. Well, thank you, Bates, for this total resolve

and I think you managed to refer to those factors and processes that do define political affairs, the international political economy of EU-Asia relations

internally and externally. And now we have the opportunity to engage, to connect with you directly. Other questions, comments?

Mr. Strzok, you are one of those behind the latest strategy of the Federal Association of German Industries in Berlin and one of the authors,

the co-authors you have dealt with Asian affairs and offer for a long time. Who will be on the panel, on the next panel? Please, yeah. Yeah, my question is quite simple. First, I found this really extremely challenging

on the one hand but it was lovely to listen to you. And I really enjoyed your analysis. And my simple question is, you put us in Europe is quite a long position, but actually we are 27, not so small country.

Some of them are small, but some of them, Germany, France, we are bigger and we have international exposure for very long. You could include to the 27 France countries, you could include Great Britain, be it with Brexit or without Brexit belonging to Europe

and being a strong liberal host as it has ever been. You could include Switzerland. And my question is, the first country I remember doing really a fundamental change vis-a-vis China was Australia. And at that time, Australia really was alone

with this change in policy. Many countries joined later into decoupling from China more. What is your analysis in why did Australia start so soon?

And what is your perception of the possibility of a new alliance of like-minded countries vis-a-vis China? Thank you for that. I realize I was probably in some ways overly pessimistic or delivering a rather discouraging message, but I think it's useful for us

to at least take it seriously and to recognize that this challenge is not going anywhere and we need to all take it a lot more seriously. So if in my pessimistic message, I was able to at least encourage a deeper set of thinking than it was useful.

I agree with you, I think, in the premise of your question that we are not really alone. There are many countries around the world that have increasingly understood this challenge and yes, are like-minded and are looking for partners,

looking for others to work through just how it is we're going to preserve the liberal order as we've come to know it. And Australia, I think, is an obvious partner in that endeavor. Why did Australia seem to be one of the early,

one of the early governments out of the gate on this problem? I'm not sure exactly, but I think it probably in part has to do with the degree to which Australia is dependent on China.

I think among G20 or among OECD countries, Australia is probably the most trade dependent on China. Something like 30 or 33% of Australian exports by value are to China, a third.

So high degree of trade dependency. And China's becoming an increasingly important investor in Australia, although it's not the largest, but nevertheless growing quite quickly. There's also been over the last 10 or 15 years a dramatic increase in immigration to Australia from China.

So I think in a sense the intensity of the engagement, while generally positive, was such that as more negative aspects of that engagement became clear,

that I think forced the question to the forefront more rapidly in ways maybe other governments around the world have not experienced. And while it's true that the news tends to cover the more dramatic aspects of this,

the foreign interference law, examples of Chinese government manipulation and cultivation of politicians, things like that, I have to say that the debate remains very lively and contested in Australia.

And I don't think we're through yet with this. There are very powerful voices in Australia who are not ready and do not wish to go down the pathway of open confrontation

and competition with China. They don't think it's strategically wise. They think it's potentially dangerous to Australian interests. And so in that sense it's very similar to what all of us are grappling with, right? So I guess the bottom line conclusion is

the degree to which governments in Europe, whether it's the EU or whether it's member states, could step up their engagement with Australian counterparts with the aim of trying to find a balanced consensus, which on the one hand recognizes and tries

to bound the more troubling aspects of engagement with China, while at the same time maintaining basically constructive relations would be, I think, very beneficial to do.

And maybe a part of the connectivity strategy, although not publicly stated as such, ought to include those sorts of consultations with other governments, including Australia and Asia. Thank you.

Professor Joe, I want to echo, first of all, what Mr. Strzok just said in complimenting Australia for the position it has been taking. In particular with regard to cyber security and 5G, I think we in Europe should follow Australia's lead.

But my question is about Asian perceptions of the role of Europe, when it's not easy to create an understanding of the role that Europe could be playing in the context of connectivity between, along the Eurasian continent.

But even more difficult, it might be to understand what Asian players are expecting from Europe. And there are two questions I want to ask in that context. One is over FOIP, the free and open in the Pacific.

What are the expectations from the Japanese and the Indian side? And the second question is about cooperation in the realm of security in a very broad sense.

As you know, the European Council has passed conclusions on security-related cooperation with Asian countries last summer. How is that being perceived in Asia? How realistic is that from the angle of relevant governments?

Well, thank you for that. It's a difficult question to answer in some ways. At a broad strategic level, I think that nearly every government and society in Asia would welcome,

strongly welcome, a serious, well-resourced and sustained effort by the European Union and its key member states to have a greater role, a greater presence, a greater capacity

to try and shape developments in Asia. I think it's generally welcome. It certainly is in Australia, and I think also in countries like Japan or India. The risk, of course, is that nothing comes of it,

that after all of this high-profile, rhetorical undertaking, which is the Asia connectivity strategy, that then nothing follows from it. We don't see more resources.

We don't see building out of diplomatic presence. We don't see sort of the money behind it to further develop the concept. In the paper that I'm gonna give later today, I make the point that let's see an early and high-profile win.

Where is there a concrete example of the EU-Asia connectivity strategy on the ground, somewhere, in India, in the Philippines? Where is it? Let's see one. That would be very powerful, I think, and have it properly branded, and you can point to it

and say that's the EU-Asia connectivity strategy right there, that project or that diplomatic initiative. That would be great, and I know that takes time and it has to be done in the right way, but let's see it early. Otherwise, I think people will be disappointed and say this is just one more EU rhetorical flourish

which isn't being properly resourced. So, we'll have to see where that is, but I think generally welcome, right? On the question of the free and open Indo-Pacific, I would urge, I think it was very clever

on the part of whoever came up with the connectivity strategy to explicitly avoid saying that it's related to the free and open Indo-Pacific. I think that's probably smart, honestly, because that concept, while I would agree with it

in principle, I think has run into a fair bit of opposition and sensitivities because it unfortunately, I think, has been sort of misbranded or misinterpreted

as about China, purely about China. And of course, the Chinese have been very effective at trying to create that perception as being an anti-China measure. So, I think the connectivity strategy is more clever

because it doesn't explicitly present itself as a explicitly anti-China undertaking, but I think everyone understands that to the degree it is not sinocentric,

to the degree it does push those sort of values and interests that I said it could at the end will have an impact of balancing at least or countering some of the more unwelcome aspects of China's influence in the region. So, I guess my advice is let's push ahead

on the connectivity concept. Let's see some concrete examples of it. And I think you'll find a welcome audience and a welcome governance in the region that want to see more in the way

of European engagement in the region. Yeah, thank you. Heinrich, faculty of installation studies. Thank you very much for your presentation. Mahatma Krishnan goes to your notion of liberal or liberalism.

He said that the liberal order is beginning to lose its leading role globally and it is challenged by an authoritarian approach that models of rule among them, the Chinese model.

But would it be necessary to distinguish between, to put it very roughly, between economic and political liberalism that didn't make this distinction as if these two were just two sides of the coin? But I think, it's my impression that this is not the case,

that we live in a situation here in the West, first of all, where the economic side of liberalism erodes the political side in the sense that more and more voters, for example, have the impression that they have no chance

any longer to see themselves as authors, as co-authors of the polity because everything is just dictated by economic markets, by lobbyists and so on and so on. So this model seems to make itself unattractive

before then it is false victim, easily false victim to those authoritarian conceptions. So shouldn't we take that into consideration? I think the real danger is that this Western post-democracy sentiment

joins with the free or non-democratic model from China and this mixture, this might be the real dangerous thing.

So there's not just a threat from East Asia, but half of this threat comes out of our own societies that no longer find the true balance here. I can't disagree with your point.

And I think you're absolutely right that simply pointing our fingers at the other guy, whether that's Moscow or Beijing or Ankara and saying that that's the problem is not going to work. And there obviously needs to be a lot more self-reflection

and understanding that much of this challenge as you've just described arises from within. I mean, it's not just a coincidence or an easy problem to solve. And clearly a more effective sort of counter narrative has to be generated,

which I think ultimately would call out or expose the flaws and the internal contradictions and the false promises, which populist, me first, nationalist narratives

would have us believe. And that's really the job of great statesmen, great stateswomen and politicians to do.

We can be a supporting chorus, I suppose, intellectually, but it just strikes me, for example, looking at that globalization index, for example, a country like Hungary ranks, I think, in the top 15. Remarkable. So here's a country that is enormously benefited

from its economic, political and social integration with the world and yet has a leadership that tries to claim that these forces have been contrary to the interest of the country.

Somehow, I think we have to regain our confidence, regain our belief, and point to the successes while acknowledging still the challenges and the need to make those successes more widely distributed and fair.

But nevertheless, overall, the successes of the globalization and democratization enterprise, huge success. And I think we just need to do a better job of explaining that and while, as you say,

taking seriously the internal contradictions that they have created for many in our countries. Easier said than done. But I take your point seriously that it's as much an internal problem as it is a problem being imposed upon us from the outside. Yeah, workflow.

Is that directly? Maybe in continuation about the values. So the same of the previous question. So common values or liberal values on the one hand and traditional, as they said in Russia, for example,

or Ankara on the other hand. So what do you think? Maybe these common values are not so common to even European countries and new accents should be made or some new approaches to the interpretation of these values. So to make it more attractive and more understandable for countries

that's Hungary, Poland, as you mentioned, even for Ukraine because we are under influence of democratization process connected to IMF financing. But if no IMF financing, this influence of democratization process, for example, would be much more lower to our society.

So this is a question. What do you think? Should we reshape attitude or new accents? I don't think we have all the answers to those very, very deep and fundamental existential questions.

I do think, though, that the model on which the European Union has always operated is making the case that its success as a more open, more democratized, accountable political body

can be exported. I think that probably demands some very, very serious reconsideration as the core,

motivating policy for the EU's internal and external strategy. Somehow or another, I think we're entering an era where the EU is going to have to assume a little bit more in the way of geopolitical realism, which is going to have to include

an understanding or at least a recognition that the European way is not going to be accepted everywhere, at least for now. Maybe at some future moment, but not now.

And in other words, I don't think the EU can continue to have that core, motivating approach principle dominating all of its engagements

with other countries, right? It's not realistic. It's surely the case, if it ever was the case, in our dealings with China and now with countries like Russia. Somehow a harder edge geopolitical realism

must play a greater part of engagement with countries like that. And not see that as a failure. I mean, it's simply a fact for the foreseeable future that the EU is not going to be able to export its model

in certain parts of the world. And as a result, a different motivating strategy has to drive the decisions in Brussels and among the member states, which is becoming more realpolitik, I think. You said something at the beginning about how Germany succeeded somehow

in both standing for the sort of post-modern belief in the end of history on the one hand, with some pretty hard-nosed realpolitik and how it dealt with Soviet Union, for example,

and others. Maybe something along those lines is exactly what the EU needs to be doing going forward. I mean, I'm sad to see that that's true, but we have to be realistic about this if the European Union's gonna survive.

Point of comment. Yeah. Professor Su Chang He, Executive Dean, School of International Relations, Public Affairs, Shanghai, Fudan University, Shanghai. Thank you. I think in terms of world order in Chinese political philosophy,

we think that the world is composed of two. One is yin, and the other is yang. Or one is zero, the other is yang. I think a Chinese chorus may be very familiar with your philosopher, Leibniz, or Chinese can let a book into Germany.

So if we think that the world is composed good and fast, and the good world should have responsibilities to change the fun world, I think maybe the world will be in a dangerous situation.

So for example, yin is the one extreme. The yang is the other extreme. We think that the opposition of the truth

may be not false. The opposition of the truth may be also truth. Then if we take this position, it is possible for a conversion between the two. The yin extreme and the yang extreme. Leibniz is a common.

of extremes, a lot of conflict of extremes. And so I think, some years ago, I also research about the liberal liberation order, but I think that it's a little bit dangerous for construction of the world, because the liberal order think

the illiberal order is back. There's a liberal order that should take measures to change the illiberal order. That will lead to some conflict or confrontation. I think in the world, maybe the correct way for us is to think how to coordinate between the two extremes,

just like China or East Asia and the European Union. As a scholar, I am always optimistic about the future of the European Union, because I think that if the European Union

take measures of dividing the group policy, then that means the collapse of the Union. But I think more and more measures of deriving the group policy. So I am not agree with the official policy

such as John Lee Sherman's theory, who think that the Anglo-Saxon members should take official policy to contain the united offal of continuity.

I think that each country should take cooperative measures of such as magic to come together. That's not a clear comment. I don't have a particular response to that,

except that I think you have encapsulated precisely the dilemma, which let's call it the liberal world order is confronting, and that is that we will increasingly hear

from those, let's just say, representative of an alternative order. The argument that we, we in the liberal world, need to be more accepting,

more comfortable with that alternative world order. That it's a fact of life, a fact of geopolitical life, and we better get used to it. We're gonna hear that argument more and more and more and more. And I guess the question for ourselves is, are we okay with that?

Can we live in this yin and yang world going forward and find ways of cooperating rather than turning it into a life or death ideological struggle? I'm not sure. But we're definitely in that period.

We are in a new era in which a lot of our assumptions and comfortable understandings about the world order as we knew it are going to be increasingly contested. And I entirely agree that, I wouldn't liken it to the Cold War.

I don't think it's that sort of an ideological struggle because of course, communist China is not communist. It's not. It's just called that. That's what the party's called. But we are entering a battle of ideas about how prepared are we to accept

that other alternative forms of governance, forms of socioeconomic polities are legitimate and acceptable. And that we should not be seeing it as our mission to try and change them.

So I think you've encapsulated it very well. But I don't think we, we in the liberal order have yet decided whether we are going to get used to it or whether we might want to develop strategies

and approaches that contest, that continue to contest that yin and yang situation. There is a further question by Mark von Kenyon, right?

And then we'll have a coffee break which will allow us to continue the discussions plurilaterally, bilaterally. Please. Thank you very much. It's been argued that part of the reason

why there's been a bit of a crisis of faith among China watchers over the past few years has been the growing occurrences of Beijing making use of geoeconomic tools against particular governments that it was felt has either insulted the Chinese nation or have basically crossed Chinese red lines, if you will. There was a diplomatic break

between China and Norway for six years. Since that time, South Korea, Philippines, and now Canada have felt these particular tools in action. And to put it extremely charitably, Canada was not ready for this and still is not ready for this. Do you see this from a European Union viewpoint as a potential warning bell

or do you see this as an example of the fact that the concern that other countries, there might be other examples of this, the countries being caught between Chinese and quote unquote Western interests will become more commonplace? Well, yes. I think clearly the Beijing leadership

has come to understand that its principal point of leverage in the international system is economic and has repeatedly used that instrument as a way to threaten and coerce

and signal displeasure in different ways. And I think what, for example, while that hammer has not yet landed on Australia, it's a kind of unspoken elephant in the room.

I've heard even from government officials in Australia privately tell me that it's not even, implicit in conversations with their Chinese counterparts behind closed doors.

It's explicit. Said right across the table, you don't want to do that because we could shut off the flow of students to Australian universities tomorrow like a light switch if we want to. So in other words,

even though there has been no overt evidence that such policies might be used or are being used toward Australia, it's there, it's sort of in the room. And I suspect that a very similar understanding takes place in Berlin and in London

and in Paris and elsewhere. So it's there, absolutely. Some countries are going to be able to weather those threats and imposition of penalties better than others.

That's just the way it is. Smaller countries are gonna have a harder time with it than would larger ones. I think, again, the Asia connectivity strategy is in principle, in part precisely to try

and mitigate those sorts of coercive threats that could be imposed by not being so sinocentric and trying to... We all talk about diversifying our economic and political strategies in Asia

so that you're not so dependent on China. Far easier said than done, obviously, but I think that's what we're seeing precisely because of what we've seen happen to countries like Norway, Philippines, South Korea. Other governments are taking note and I think are wisely trying, to the best they can,

it's not easy, but wisely trying to find other pathways and avenues so that when that punishment comes, which it may well, it won't hurt quite as bad and governments will have other options. Well, thank you, Bates.

Sure. Thank you. Thank you.