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Science, Scientists and Society

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spaceplay / pause qunload | stop ffullscreen shift + ←→slower / faster (latest Chrome and Safari) ↑↓volume mmute ←→seek . seek to previous 12…6 seek to 10%, 20%, …60% Andrè Cournand (1981) Science, Scientists and Society Comment André Cournand was born in Paris almost precisely two months before Alfred Nobel had his famous will signed at the Swedish-Norwegian Club there. As is well known today, the will formulates a general “umbrella” statement for the five prizes, namely “to those who, during the preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind”. With Cournand, there is no problem to see that the second part of this sentence is fulfilled, since the method of catheterization of the heart certainly has saved many lives. Cournand lectured at Lindau six times and even though he participated in 1984, the present lecture is his last. It is quite interesting to see that he did not stick with the fascinating success story of heart catheterization, a story which certainly could have inspired the young researchers and students at each one of the meetings. Instead his choice of topics was much broader and in 1981, the year of his last lecture at Lindau, at age 85, he read a short text on science, scientists and society. It seems that after his retirement, Cournand had become interested in the work of the French futurist and philosopher Gaston Berger (1896-1960), and he combines this interest with his own long experience and general interest in the conduct and method of science. Although he states that his lecture is mainly for the young people, Cournand has written a text that probably went over the head of many of the young researchers and students in the audience. He refers to both Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi and tells the story of the scientific paradigm shift from Newtonian mechanics to the quantum theory of Max Planck and Albert Einstein. Although the text is read in English, sometimes he returns to his mother language and several times uses the French word “savant”. Whether this is a slip of mind or a careful reminder that he believes that a scientist should be more than a researcher, is an unanswered question! Anders Bárány
Transcript: English(auto-generated)
This is about the only German word
that I will pronounce here for this audience. My speech is mostly addressed to the young people in this audience, because I do not doubt that the senior member of this audience
are very familiar with most of the idea that I have in the course of the last 15 years brought together, since I retired from investigation of respiration and cardiovascular function.
I had, since that time, the opportunity to become acquainted with the French philosophy of Gaston Bergé and to learn about the prospective attitude and method. I have also had occasion to reflect on my own experience
as a scientist and to apply to those reflection the penetrating insight of my friend Robert K. Merton on the conduct and method of science. In all of this, I have sought to identify certain intellectual linkages between the ideas of Bergé
and Merton and to consider their bearing on the overriding problem of our time, that is, the creation of a rational world, order for a world gone awry. The goal of the prospective method, to present it briefly,
is to create alternative images of the future that will serve the process of decision-making in the present. Creation of these images is a result of an analysis in depth of situation, identification of facts or events, pregnant with future possibility
and anticipation and projection of a possible and desirable development. In this sense, it is somewhat akin to the creative process of the natural science, the process through which different hypotheses are devised and then submitted to experiment.
The crucial difference, of course, between scientific and prospective method is that the testing of hypotheses arrived at through the prospective method with regard to the future lies only in the ulterior judgment of history.
Now, scientific knowledge, whether fundamental or applied, evolves within the framework of a model that the physicist historian Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolution, has called the scientific paradigm. This model holds scientists within the limits
of a theoretical, conceptual, methodological, and technical order. At work within that accepted order, scientists exemplify three different types, the investigator-discoverer, the verifier-consolidator,
and the revolutionary, who denounce the weaknesses of the prevailing paradigm and ultimately goes beyond its limit to create a new model. Until the beginning of the 20th century, classical mechanics ascribed mainly to the genius of Isaac Newton and elaborated
by numerous physicists defined the paradigm of natural science. The model physical content relied upon the postulates that an ether filled the universe, and that time was absolute. This paradigm made possibly tremendous development
of scientific knowledge as investigator-discoverers, aided by the verifier-consolidators pursued their research. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, the discovery of fundamental theoretical incoherency and of paradoxical experimental results
jeopardized the model defined by classical mechanics. The first experiment evidence of quantum behavior of light, namely the discontinuous emission of energy found by Max Planck in 1900 to account for the black body radiation effect, revealed some mysterious unknown sector of the physical world that could not
be analyzed in the context of classical mechanics. A momentous change in scientific thought occurred in that period through the genius of Albert Einstein. His revolutionary, all-embracing ideas about the nature of the physical world completely changed the prevailing paradigm.
Einstein's ideas evolved in two stages. First, the concept of absolute time was rejected and replaced by that of relative time. And the second consists of postulating the discontinuity of interaction between light and such constituents
of matter as atoms. Simultaneously, experiments regarded as paradoxical under the old concept of the continuous nature of light became interpretable, and the basis for the development of quantum mechanics came into existence. In these ways, Einstein established a new padding with a new representation of space time
and new description of the interaction of light with matter. Working with his framework, de Broglie, Niels Bohr, Edwin Schrodinger, Werner Eisenberg, and Paul Dirac, among others, construct mathematically consistent models of physical system.
Together, with experimental discoveries such as radioactivity, these models led to our present interpretation of nature at the microscopic as well as the cosmological level. In order to explain the mechanism of this true mutation
in scientific thought, Henri Poincare has proposed that the revolutionary scientist experiences what is tantamount to a vision. Although the vision frequently occurs to scientists in their early 20s, it has always
been preceded by a prolonged period of preparation and incubation. Einstein, for example, record the profound influence of Ernest Mach's book, Philosophy of Science, which he read when he was a schoolboy. The vision is similar to a religious revelation
in more than one respect, and it is sometimes favored by moral moratorium, the term used by Eric Erickson in his biography of Martin Luther to describe the temporary abandonment of traditional practices and believe in the course of a religious conversion.
As with the creative process in the artist, the beauty of the new creation is proof for the scientists that this new concept of reality is valid. The revolutionary is not necessarily the one who verifies his or her own discovery.
Recognition by other scientists of the validity of a new paradigm comes but slowly. It is achieved through the result of observation or experiment performed by the investigator, discoverer, and the verifier, consolidator, and pursued within the framework of the new padding that
substitute itself with what went before. When faced by a new fact and idea, the investigator-discoverers must ask themselves questions prompted by their curiosity.
This curiosity is particular. It is sustained by a heuristic function, which lead the discoverer in their quest for a truth that non-reductionist scientists know can be only relative. Both the revolutionary vision and the investigator-discoverer
spirit of inquiry contribute to the constant renewal of scientific world. The mental process through which the savant pursues his or her creative mission has been the subject of a profound analysis by Michael Polanyi in his book, Personal Knowledge.
According to Polanyi, scientific investigators are not neutral witnesses to their own discovery. In fact, for the savant, there is no knowledge other than personal knowledge. His intelligent and passionate participation
create an intimate contact beyond comprehension itself with what he or she perceive and conceive as reality. But even Polanyi's insightful analysis and recognition of the special character of scientific curiosity are not sufficient to account for scientific renewal.
The scientist's mental processes are supplemented with consciousness of a role, a context based on a set of moral values in a phrase, a code of ethics. The principles specified by this code assert the number that should underline and direct
the scientist's objectives in research and in his or her conduct towards others within the institution of science itself. I have discussed this code of ethics on a number of occasions and have analyzed the modification imposed by time, numerous external pressures,
and the growing interaction between science and society. I will limit myself here to a few comments on one or two of those principles of the code, namely the disinterestedness and the sense of belonging of scientific community to a scientific community, commend to the scientist
the notion that his own work is but one facet of a vast enterprise that is regulated according to the ethos of science formulated in 1942 by Robert Merton, and that he is bound to his colleagues by sheer tradition
and by their common effort to promote scientific knowledge. The idea, no, the second element of the code is a new one. It is the recognition of social responsibility,
a norm acknowledged by a growing number of scientists, which marks an important step in their spiritual development and constitutes a sound response to the detractors of science. The idea of involving science with social action has recently taken an active institutionalized form
in France, initiated by the organization of the Universal Movement for Scientific Responsibility, for short, MIRS. The original and specific aim of this movement is to bring together under various forms of assembly
scientists who develop new knowledge, political leaders who hold the power of decision making, and representative of the public, which provides moral and final support to science. Thereby, our creative platform, an opportunity to discuss thoroughly topics concerning
new scientific and technical discovery, their potential social benefits, and their risk and other problems of common interest. And also, in the course of those unions, the politician and the public will become acquainted with the way the scientists are thinking.
The scientific code formulate, somewhat differently from earlier statement, raises two new questions. First, can the code serve as a basis for the development of a human ethic appropriate for the management in the future
of planetary problems of our time? I shall deal with this subject a little while. Industrialized nations have plunged headlong into applying the technique of science, thus accelerating the rhythm of social and cultural revolution and determining or intensifying changes
that affect people's consciousness and hopes. More recently, the underdeveloped countries have embarked on a course that, although not identical with that of the developed nations, raise the hope of their leaders
that they will succeed in upgrading their human potential through a course to modern technology. But these countries do not always respond to the most urgent necessity, such as the establishment and consolidation of an economic system that meets
the needs of the particular country or the satisfaction of even the most basic nutritional requirement of its people. In both industrialized and underdeveloped country, change comes about in a manner at once unequal and unbalanced.
This was characterized by Pierre Massé as blind emergence. Instead of a harmonious system that would provide efficiently for the needs of all, an unbalanced world economy emerges, subject to the wildest fluctuation. The inequality between the have and the have not
increases simultaneously with uncontrolled technological growth. Left to itself, this blind emergence presents a direct contrast with what should be humanized emergence. This would introduce order into chaos,
protect the individual, and at the same time, organize the collectivity, a great utopian to satisfy. Finding the means to control the process of emergence in a manner favorable to the survival of humanity
is an urgent necessity. To this end, the industrialized nation need to develop a new and effective ethic that should constitute a model of development for nation, regions, and ethnic groups in order to favor the maximum humanization.
The most appropriate application of technology according to basic needs and positive project for the future with, as a fundamental objective, a decent way of life for every human being. In recent years, several suggestions have been made regarding an ethic where science
will play a crucial role. Two of these suggestions are fundamentally opposed. The Ethic of Knowledge, proposed by Jacques Monod, and the Ethic of Development, proposed by Pierre Massé. Monod's characterization of an ethic
is founded on the sole principle of the objectivity of knowledge. In his own term, the only goal, the sovereign good for man, is not his happiness, his temporal power or comfort, nor the Socratic know thyself. It is objective knowledge itself.
This is a rigid and constraining ethic, which it respects man as a supporter of knowledge, nevertheless defines the value superior to man itself. Admirable though it may be in proclaiming that science is by definition an ascetic doctrine,
the authoritarian character of this ethic constitutes a return to what is kind of scientists accessible only to qualified scientists. Consider in this manner, scientific technocracy would create a new aristocracy whose ideal would be far
from liberal and would engender abusers without necessarily contributing to an improvement in the welfare of human society. Pierre Massé rejects such a scientist, proposing instead an alternative solution, the ethic of development to serve mankind.
He stresses compromise, harmony, and conciliation. Quality derived from the thesis that biological survival of the individual as well as of the species depends upon accommodation between rigidity and plasticity,
between the imperious nature of genes and the ability to adapt to environmental pressure. He believes that the sheer adventure of the species should be extended to human society.
In refuting the impractable mechanism of emergence as ruthless and unmerciful for the individual, this ethic will enrich society by adding a dimension of justice and love. This appeal to the sentiment of love reminds me of Bertrand Russell's comment
during an interview in 1957. Even though this great English logician, mathematician, philosopher remain an atheist to the end of his days, he affirmed his adherence to a code of conduct
in the following terms. And I quote him, or I quote the interview. In truth, it concerns a first principle that is both simple and trite. So simple, in fact, that I am almost ashamed to express it,
fearing the smiles of derision of cynics who consider themselves wise men. The word I wish to use to define it, and I beg you to excuse me, is love, Christian love,
in some compassion. The goal of mass's ethical development should inspire us to discover a solution to the urgent problem of our time, to promote abundance more equitably, to become conscious of our responsibility vis-a-vis other nations and individuals,
and to distribute the fruits of knowledge in an equitable fashion. I come now to the second question raised by the code of behavior by which scientists govern themselves. To whom should science address itself? At the beginning of modern science,
the major concern of its two principal creators, Francis Bacon and René Descartes, being the fate of the world with the necessity to develop a universal audience receptive to the achievement of science and the formulation of an ethic.
Bacon wrote in Valerius Terminus, published 1603, 1604, in the foreign term, God has bestowed on man the capacity to explore all knowledge on condition that he places that knowledge at the service
of the state and society. If not, all forms of knowledge must become evil and serpentine. Descartes, in answer to the question, to whom should science address itself, spoke of the law that obliges us to reach out for all that is in us, that is, the general good
of mankind. Science must be generously construed as an enterprise that involves all humanity. That's the end of my quotation of Descartes. The point of view of these two founders of modern science
reinforces the thesis I have proposed. The need for applying the scientific code to the establishment of an ethic for our time. This code and an ethic proposed by Massey, are they not complementary? Does not the possibility of their unification
suggest in turn the possibility of creating a universal order based on the cooperation of both the scientific investigators and of a public that includes all mankind? Does not this code preach the universality of science? Do not the norms of intellectual honesty, tolerance,
objectivity, disinterestedness, and submission to a communal order favor the condition necessary for obtaining this universality and for establishing a harmonious balance in human relations?
This goal, I'm afraid, may seem utopian. But as the French poet Valéry has written, man's true worth lies in his ability to surpass his own highest achievements. If my own view of shaping the future is any guide,
this goal should be reached by emphasis on a prospective type of education, which encourage us to adapt to circumstances of an ever-changing world. To acquire an open mind and the intellectual capacity to analyze all subjects in depth
and in their potential interrelation. To be ready to act efficiently in order to obtain what is desirable. To invent ways of communication and dialogue that promote understanding among peoples and nations.
And to develop, above all, a genuine, deep-seated feeling for a human being. This speech now has come to its end. And it does represent what an old investigator,
long past his prime, had to offer to the younger generation. That is the hope that, of course, eliminating the possibility of atomic war, we should try to satisfy in the future.
Thank you.