BIO HACKING VILLAGE - Selfie or Mugshot? The power of facial recognition technology and the implications for genetic discrimination

Video thumbnail (Frame 0) Video thumbnail (Frame 727) Video thumbnail (Frame 1535) Video thumbnail (Frame 2502) Video thumbnail (Frame 3536) Video thumbnail (Frame 4267) Video thumbnail (Frame 5777) Video thumbnail (Frame 7303) Video thumbnail (Frame 8650) Video thumbnail (Frame 9911) Video thumbnail (Frame 10822) Video thumbnail (Frame 11838) Video thumbnail (Frame 13991) Video thumbnail (Frame 15788) Video thumbnail (Frame 19416) Video thumbnail (Frame 20201) Video thumbnail (Frame 21328) Video thumbnail (Frame 23840) Video thumbnail (Frame 25348) Video thumbnail (Frame 26934) Video thumbnail (Frame 29186) Video thumbnail (Frame 30154) Video thumbnail (Frame 31199) Video thumbnail (Frame 31936) Video thumbnail (Frame 35394) Video thumbnail (Frame 41313) Video thumbnail (Frame 49312)
Video in TIB AV-Portal: BIO HACKING VILLAGE - Selfie or Mugshot? The power of facial recognition technology and the implications for genetic discrimination

Formal Metadata

Title
BIO HACKING VILLAGE - Selfie or Mugshot? The power of facial recognition technology and the implications for genetic discrimination
Title of Series
Author
License
CC Attribution 3.0 Unported:
You are free to use, adapt and copy, distribute and transmit the work or content in adapted or unchanged form for any legal purpose as long as the work is attributed to the author in the manner specified by the author or licensor.
Identifiers
Publisher
Release Date
2018
Language
English

Content Metadata

Subject Area
Abstract
Thanks to the use of DNA in criminal investigations, hundreds of innocent people have been exonerated from crimes they did not commit. DNA has also been used to used to arrest suspects in cold cases! In my presentation I will give a primer on the techniques used for DNA profiling and the statistics for false positives. The bulk of my presentation will be looking into the vulnerabilities of current DNA profiling methods and how a malicious actor could actually reconstruct enough genotypic information of any innocent person from just a picture of their face. This is based on recently published Nature Genetics research and extends the methods to suggest that it would only take ~50 million face:genotype samples to have a sufficient genotypic mapping that would allow someone to recreate your 23andMe profile (602,000 SNPs) from a selfie.
Pattern recognition Information
Pattern recognition Natural number Computer science Computer Student's t-test Student's t-test Mathematical optimization Mathematical optimization Hypothesis Hypothesis
Context awareness Integrated development environment Sound effect Natural language Right angle Software testing Shape (magazine) Port scanner Local ring
Discrete group Regulator gene Protein Code Protein Neuroinformatik Sequence Coding theory Different (Kate Ryan album) Order (biology) Natural language Software testing Right angle Bounded variation Information security
Predictability Theory of relativity Information Multiplication sign Planning Planning Type theory Digital photography Error message Prediction Different (Kate Ryan album) Faktorenanalyse Natural language Family Error message
Polymorphism (materials science) System call Theory of relativity Temporal logic Cellular automaton Mathematical analysis GEDCOM Sequence Sign (mathematics) Pattern matching Sample (statistics) Bit rate Personal digital assistant String (computer science) Order (biology) Chain Website Quicksort Freeware Metropolitan area network Resultant
Digital photography Digital photography Physical law Order (biology) Motion capture Right angle Natural language Information Demoscene Identity management
Discrete group Regulator gene Different (Kate Ryan album) Computer Family Demoscene Computer
Source code Source code Sampling (statistics) Database Database Sequence Digital photography Sample (statistics) Software testing Natural language Software testing Quicksort Software development kit
Spectrum (functional analysis) Hoax Clique-width Natural language Texture mapping Computer-generated imagery Motion capture Graph coloring Hypothesis Medical imaging Natural number Extension (kinesiology) Predictability Polymorphism (materials science) Texture mapping Scaling (geometry) Information Mapping Sampling (statistics) Variance Hierarchy Infinite conjugacy class property Order (biology) Website Quicksort Bounded variation Geometry Extension (kinesiology)
Spectrum (functional analysis) Scale (map) Statistics Group action Pattern recognition Polymorphism (materials science) Information Texture mapping Uniqueness quantification Computer-generated imagery Projective plane Likelihood function Template (C++) Logic synthesis Hierarchy Writing Digital photography Chain output Website Right angle Quicksort Bounded variation Extension (kinesiology)
Discrete group Regulator gene Texture mapping Multiplication sign Quicksort Computer Family Demoscene Computer
Discrete group Coma Berenices Information privacy Surgery Neuroinformatik Number Different (Kate Ryan album) Office suite Information security Associative property Identity management Software development kit Family Surgery Regulator gene Pseudonymization Plastikkarte Entire function Vector space Integral domain Order (biology) Natural language Figurate number Family Identity management Spectrum (functional analysis) Resultant Spacetime
Pattern recognition Hoax Key (cryptography) Computer-generated imagery Computer Neuroinformatik Uniform resource locator Digital photography Exterior algebra Integrated development environment Computer hardware Order (biology) Computer hardware Encryption Encryption Quicksort Hacker (term) Website Computer-assisted translation
Service (economics) Algorithm Electric generator Regulator gene Artificial neural network Computer-generated imagery Virtual machine Perturbation theory Term (mathematics) Information privacy Thresholding (image processing) Computer Information privacy Medical imaging Digital photography Computer hardware Telecommunication Order (biology) Iteration Right angle Encryption Information Computer-assisted translation
Service (economics) Execution unit Email Information Mathematical analysis Database Term (mathematics) Information privacy Information privacy Sound effect Telecommunication Personal digital assistant Term (mathematics) Telecommunication Order (biology) Condition number Right angle Information Quicksort System identification
Service (economics) Information Natural language Basis <Mathematik> Term (mathematics) Group action Generic programming Vector potential Information privacy Local Group Degree (graph theory) Cross-correlation Basis <Mathematik> Telecommunication Information Quicksort Electric current
Service (economics) Set (mathematics) Database Bit Term (mathematics) Thresholding (image processing) Information privacy Integer factorization Mathematics Goodness of fit Right angle Natural language Information Quicksort
Point (geometry) Spectrum (functional analysis) Randomization Divisor State of matter Texture mapping Natural language Computer-generated imagery Set (mathematics) Protein Perspective (visual) Writing Different (Kate Ryan album) Scale (map) Pattern recognition Polymorphism (materials science) Regulator gene Information Demoscene Logic synthesis Hierarchy Word Process (computing) Vector space Quicksort Musical ensemble Bounded variation
Length Natural language Multiplication sign Computer Medical imaging Different (Kate Ryan album) Information God Identity management Family Area Service (economics) Polymorphism (materials science) Mapping Perturbation theory Term (mathematics) GEDCOM Regulärer Ausdruck <Textverarbeitung> Sequence Entire function Hierarchy Digital photography Order (biology) Mathematical singularity Website Right angle Encryption Figurate number Quicksort Bounded variation Reading (process) Point (geometry) Spectrum (functional analysis) Computer-generated imagery Gene cluster Profil (magazine) String (computer science) Hierarchy Software testing Form (programming) Matching (graph theory) Information Physical law Projective plane Planning Information privacy Film editing Integral domain Personal digital assistant Natural language Identity management Spectrum (functional analysis)
Server (computing) Source code Virtual machine Set (mathematics) Telecommunication Different (Kate Ryan album) Videoconferencing Representation (politics) Information Error message Service (economics) Mapping Information Regulator gene Physical law Expert system Coordinate system Term (mathematics) Information privacy File Transfer Protocol Degree (graph theory) Uniform resource locator Hard disk drive Video game Right angle Quicksort Musical ensemble Family Active contour model
all right without any further ado this
is an Kim with selfie or mugshot today I'll be presenting selfie or mug shot and they're a way to help you get less that GUI okay that's a little better so I'll be presenting selfie or mug shot and it's the idea that you can actually reconstruct genetic information from just facial information and the TLDR is
you could take a fun snapshot like this and then reconstruct genetic information and then maybe go to jail or get pwned in some other way so Who am I
pero I'm Ann Kim and I'm a graduate student at MIT studying computer science and molecular biology my thesis and startup work is in clinical trial optimization using federated learning and watching my hobbies include running slacklining learning yazz flute and paranoia so everyone has a side hobby but my side hobby is reading nature
genetics papers so I was reading this fun one and it was about genome-wide mapping of global to local genetic effects on human facial shape so essentially connecting your facial cranial shape with genetic information sounds really nifty except for the
context of news today so there's a lot of people blindly taking genetic tests just trying to figure out how white they are like you know their ancestry and then you also have people who are like taking a lot of obnoxious selfies as well as an environment where you have surveillance all over you know a Canadian mall even an Turkey right so today I'll be imparting onto you my
paranoia and I'll be first giving a preface on basic genetics as well as telling you about how this can be potentially abused by insurance companies or your employers as well as criminal investigators and then also telling you just like scoping out your paranoia and telling you uh you know when will this be possible how many people do you need to like take selfies of themselves they're like you know do test recom and how expensive will it be to create a pack see out of you but never fear I'll also be giving you some solutions of how you can use personal discretion secure computation as well as regulation in order to protect yourselves so a little bit about
my friend DNA the whole genome sequence was done in about 2003 and it's 3 billion base pairs in your human genome wonderful right so much but only 2% is actually useful for protein coding and between you and me it's only like 0.4% difference and what you're paying 200 for is 0.01 6% of your genotype or your whole genome which makes up your genotype for 23andme but even with the
small amount of DNA you can do a bunch of stuff you can figure out your ancestry where you came from missing relatives that were estranged some time ago you can figure out genetic risk factors that are gonna get you in the night and you can also figure out future risk prediction for family planning for all your brood genetic information have
techniques have advanced so much they can actually use facial information for phenotype ik and this is especially useful for children who have different types of diseases that might not have symptoms that they can actually express to you so you can have faster diagnosis like diagnosis before they can actually speak and you can also have more precise diagnosis because oftentimes with sequencing you have a lot of genetic variants and a lot of sequencing errors it can be really hard to decouple the two from each other and this is overall much cheaper because it's much cheaper to just take a photo of someone as opposed to paying like 600 for a whole genome sequence another benefit of genetic sequencing is potentially
catching criminals so this method has been used since like 1987 and what has recently been used for for the it's been used recently for the Golden State Killer and if you're not familiar with the talk or we're not familiar with the crime yesterday almost humor BJ somewhere over there gave an and talk about the techniques used to actually catch him but in brief this was a man who had a lot of strains of murders as well as rapes between 1975 and 1986 the police had all this DNA in this cold case and they decided to get creative and upload it to this website called dead match and this is a website where you can upload your genetic information for free and then figure out who all your estranged relatives are the police uploaded the DNA posing as this man and then they found all the third and fourth cousins of this man who had uploaded their own DNA and as a result they're able to match the suspects DNA in order to get a warrant for his arrest the techniques for doing this have been
done since like 1987 and it's about a one in a trillion positive or false positive rate the methods are endless for this you can use a polymerase chain reaction or PCR in order to amplify any like minut amount of DNA and I'll use a bunch of other methods I won't bore you with them but the flavor of investigators these days they short tandem repeats or STR and what this is is a technique where you take all your genetic information and instead of doing a whole sequence because that's too expensive for criminal investigations you just look at 13 sites just like at 13 sites and call it a day where you can figure out sort of identifying them based on these 13 sites and below you have an STR of 15 sites as well as the ml gene that tells you what gender this person was good enough let's think about
a dystopian s-- scenario for all this information because after all we're at
Def Con right so the risk of DNA and
identity are twofold one someone can frame you for a crime make you a patsy or to genetic discrimination so in order to put you out as a criminal they have to first capture your DNA replicate enough of it and then plant it at the scene of a crime for genetic discrimination we have laws like genetic information non-discrimination Act of 2008 or Geena this provisions that your insurance as well as your employers can't actually discriminate against you based on your genetic information but could your employers actually use your photo to discriminate against you or your insurers maybe and reconstruct your genetic information I don't know getting scared yet so let's go through all the
questions that you might be having like how could someone actually frame me for a crime I've done nothing wrong I recycle I'm vegan um how much would it actually cost how long would it take in my discretion my family's discretion computers or regulation protect me well could your employer's insurers actually get away with this heinous crime should you can actually be scared so there are
three steps for framing someone for a crime first you have to capture their DNA second you have to replicate enough of it and third plant it in a crime scene so there are a lot of different
sources of DNA one is that you could actually just take a sample of their like cheek or maybe some skin or some hair potentially you could hack into some of the databases that have one of the 15 million humans in the United States who have done genotyping or genome sequencing or and like this has exploded recently in 2017 tons of people maximized on the Amazon Black Friday sale like 23andme kits and it's estimated that about 100 million people will have had some sort of genetic testing by 2025 another source of DNA though believe it or not the selfie now
you might be wondering how can you possibly get genetic information from just a photo of yourself let me science you guys so in this
really exciting paper I read in nature these researchers took 2329 Europeans and you might be saying this is very small sample and why Jessie Europeans so the reason why they took so many they took only 2,300 people and particularly those only Europeans was because they wanted to reduce the variance so they narrowed it down to just Europeans and they wanted to boost the statistical significance of any signal that would get from this very small cohort the methods that they used were stereo spectral photography so what this is is that they have two cameras and it captures the depth in your face in order to get a geometry of your face what was particularly interesting about this method is that they found the most variation around your nose and using hierarchical spectral clustering they're able to divide your face into 68 or not 68 38 associated snips or a single nucleotide polymorphisms which are sites of high variation in your genetic information so essentially they're like 38 sites in your face that map perfectly to 38 sites in your genetic information well what is the extension of this say I
don't know you have like 50 million diverse people so now you're not just talking about Europeans you're talking about Asian people black people purple people European people and you have 50 million of these diverse people not only doing spectral imaging which you can only capture depth width but you can also get color and this would be captured maybe with iPhone 10 or whatever like next-generation photography devices we have and then oh there's a question I don't think that that's their initiative I mean I am not pretty to that information but that's a good hypothesis certainly so from all of this information you could actually get a mapping of 50 million people's faces to their genetic information and with that mapping you can actually project some sort of prediction of genetic information from just a face and the particular genetic information with this huge scale of information would be genotype of 602 602 thousand snips enough to fake a 23andme genotype and if that's not scary enough you could actually use
this technique called imputation to reconstruct all three billion base pairs and imputation is just a fancy statistical method where you use information about the likelihood of certain snips correlating with others to reconstruct the rest of your genome so
it looks like our evil mastermind has captured your DNA from just your Instagram selfie but how they replicate it the cost of replication is quite high
it's 10 cents per base pair and that really explodes when you're trying to build your genome base by base which currently would cost around 300 billion dollars you could also do it with CRISPR and with CRISPR techniques you would get like some sort of template DNA and just edit the sites that make them unique recall there's like 0.4% variation so this would cost a little cheaper you know mueslix a 120 billion dollars there are other techniques that mr. Bromley actually looked at two days ago so if you are interested look at his talk and there's also an initiative from the George church group as well as other biologists who are actually trying to scale the human genome through synthetic editing oh whoops I'm sorry its million okay my bad oh and it seems like it's much cheaper than I thought it was but still pretty expensive a little tired okay but very expensive and potentially getting cheaper with this initiative of the genome project right and this is a way they're using sort of the template of the human genome project to scale back something that was once a 1 billion dollar genome sequencing project to a thousand genome which is what we currently have and so they're trying to transfer those innovations with the recreation of genetic information alternatively even though it's not billions of dollars millions of dollars is pretty expensive alternatively a cheaper way to get genetic information is simply to steal it and just amplify it so abandoning everything that I said about like facial recognition and like photos what's much cheaper is to actually steal your hair or steal a cup and then amplify it using a polymerase chain reaction or PCR so it looks like
they've captured you get your DNA and they've also replicated it for either millions of dollars or less than 100 less than 100 dollars if they actually have access to your physical body and then planting it in the crime scene is you know use your imagination you like bribe the like the cook or something or sleeping with the butler and you steal their genetic information I'm imagining your target is very rich or something cuz why else I don't know but then you plant it in the crime scene so some of
the answers to the questions of can someone actually frame me for a crime it would cost a lot of money currently millions of dollars not billions thank you for the correction and then it would also take lots and lots of time potentially this might be an initiative that might be like five years in the future so if you have any sort of imminent crimes that you're planning you'll have to wait on that should you actually be scared that might be a religious question so addressing the other questions can my discretion my family is discretion computers or regulation save me and if they can't will my ensures and employee employers actually get away with such a crime so
this was from the Proceedings of the American Society of microbiology and they said genomic surveillance is neither hype or hope nor hype it's reality so let's dive into this reality and figure out how to protect your DNA there are three different ways I
recommend discretion secure computation or regulation so with discretion you
have to not only cover yourself but also your family members because if your family member is including your third and fourth cousins upload any of your genetic entire genetic information you're in big trouble you might be the golden sea killer so don't associate any of your DNA with your identity so if you have to do 23andme your ancestry or com I'd recommend using a pseudonym getting the kit like shipped to a shared office space doing a number of different ways to like pay for it with prepaid debit cards or something and whatever you use in order to hide your digital identity when you look at your results second do not upload your DNA because it is subject to whatever the privacy policies are of whatever website you're using so beware and then try not to leave stray hairs behind because that's a really easy vector of attack potentially you can also consider makeup or plastic surgery so recall that I mentioned the techniques for this was using a stereo spectral imagery and if you have unusually thick beard you might be safe until they actually learn how to like see past it with new cameras or something a fun thing to use to hide your identity is makeup
so recall World War one we have a lot of ships and they're trying to shoot other ships so in order to hide them we use something called dazzling and this was a technique in order to obfuscate the speed of the ships and their exact locations mix success and then World War two is obviously abandoned but it's pretty successful for facial recognition technology and this is just an example of CV dazzle an alternative to protect
near DNA is using maybe computers you might have your genetic information either on a website or on your own personal device please use whatever encryption methods that you know how to handle and then maybe if you want it to actually peek at it you'd have to decrypt it that sounds pretty bad maybe you could use some sort of like home or fake encryption to learn on it or like federated learning or some sort of Hardware integrated computation where you actually store the like data and it like manages the keys for you say like a trusted execution environment or something alternatively if you still want to upload those cute cat photos but
you don't want anyone to know that you have a cat or you don't want anyone to know that your face is like a cat because you're like Hermione Granger or something you might want to consider image poisoning using Ganz or generative adversarial neural networks and the way this works is that say I have a face I have a cat face and I want to fool people particularly whoever I'm up or the machine learning algorithm for discriminating whether it's my face or not and fool it into thinking it's guacamole so with a generative adversarial neural network what you have is you have two neural networks one is generative and one is discriminative so the first one is trying to generate examples of cat photos and the other one is trying to discern cat or guacamole and they go back and forth and at each iteration the generative neural network will actually make small perturbations in the image in order to fool it and at some threshold you'll be satisfied with this image and it look fairly like a cat that'll actually be registered as guacamole new Instagram filter maybe
so other ways of protecting your DNA is through regulation so you have your Fourth Amendment rights you have the privacy policies of whatever company you're using you have California's 2016 Electronic Communications Privacy Act if you're if you live in California and you have Chyna Gina Gina the genetic information non-discrimination Act of 2008 so the Fourth Amendment you have
the right to secure your persons this could extend to your DNA and you have the right against unreasonable search and seizures so in the case of the Golden State Killer potentially he had the right to protect his genetic information and prevent it from actually having some sort of unreasonable search or seizure or in any other example that's like adversarial you also have the Terms of Use and privacy policies of whatever website you're using to get your genetic analysis so this is an example of get match the company that outed the Golden State Killer and you can see that they do not make any promises of you know securing your genetic information so whoever their third cousin was who did not read the privacy policies you know that was on them 23andme is a little better so they actually require that there has to be a warrant for you in order for them to give up your genetic information kind of better you also have California's electronic
communication Privacy Act so through this act the government can't coerce a custodian or steward of your genetic of your electronic information in order to like make an arrest without a search warrant so what this means is like for Gmail if you put all your like emails and Gmail and the government does not have a warrant for your arrest and they ask Google and they try to coerce Google into like giving you their data then Google doesn't have to but obviously if they have a warrant then yeah they have everything and this could obviously extend to genetic information that is electronically stored for Gina this is a
little better so the genetic information non-discrimination Act says that it prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information with respect to health insurance and employment that seems like pretty good coverage to me you know they acknowledge that genetic information is extremely valuable so should be shared for insight to a certain degree but obviously this could be abused by your insurer or employer who could see your genetic information predict that you're going to get hunting's disease and doesn't want to hire you because you're at risk the next clause although genes are facially neutral markers I don't think it's very
neutral after the talk that I just gave so this is quite concerning that gina has not been updated since 2008 with these findings that were published in 2018 about how there's actually some correlation with facial information and genetic information so I will leave you with sort of a to-do of trying to fix this or you know weariness that Gina does not currently protect you with you know your face Thanks please take no
more selfies and stay paranoid I'm Ann Kim if you have questions please like go to the mic and ask them or you can also ask them just you or something [Applause] okay from one paranoid to another it seems like the scenario of hunting in there is a little bit contrived I mean the really scary thing is targeted genetic attacks with chemical or biological factors that one knows are you know certain segments of DNA are susceptible - yeah for sure that's definitely concerned but sure so the question concerned targeted biological attacks using I guess metabolites and your genetic information right to sort of say that you have a certain threshold for certain poisons the problem with that though is that you can't target people enough it's by threshold so you would actually target not only then success but also you would target anyone who has a threshold lower than them of poison and I'm not sure how that would play out in whatever your attack would look like but it might be like half a mall dead or something that might implicate you and a lot of trouble good question you just like maybe you're right so those are those are changes after genetic information so they don't change genetic information at all but that also reminds me of like epigenetic changes and epigenetic changes are actually on top of your genetic information and might not necessarily come out in some of this research unless if you have like a large enough data set and you're accounting for not only genetic information but also genetic expression and epigenetics Oh Bennet like how much if you your face was deformed like are there ways you can like the partner face easily that would like all these yeah so the question was
is there a deformity that like a facial
deformity I potentially could fool any of these genome mappers and the answer is yes it's any sort of nose job could potentially fool these genome mappers because a lot of the variation in your face is actually captured in your nose and that sort of makes sense like from an evolutionary biology perspective that like you know a lot of this is connected to how you survived and stuff so nose jobs if you use nose jobs and makeup Hollywood's doing it right yes mr. Brimley they actually took a Juggalo bake-off and randomization recognition smaller and right now it beats it so far insane clown posse thank you yep so all of the protections that you listed were basically from the United States yes is there any effort to make international yes so the question was about international regulations and for Europe they have some nifty thing called gdpr and there's actually a very specific clause that talks about genetic information but currently in its state it does not address facial information because this is extremely new research yes absolutely the legal set of things that they showed before the member for the future for your face probably not going to be this wrong because words [Music] okay so show really reiterate the Fourth Amendment does not protect you the Fourth Amendment will protect you depending on your lawyer cool are you gonna get some microphone you think there's ass okay yes yes so the the PCR seems like a viable attack vector at this point I'm thinking like a biologic evil made attack where the maid takes some of your hair uses a hundred dollar PCR to amplify plants at a crime scene is there anything about PCR amplified DNA that that makes it obviously different than native DNA well it depends on the like material that they're using and they can certainly I'm pretty sure that the synthetic material that they're using and the bio the natural material of your body is quite similar like I don't think you can actually distinguish them but I'll have to double-check good question but do you want to use the mic comment methylation what do you mean by that oh yeah okay so there is actually there's a lot of differences it's not only methyl it so yes so PCR is different for a couple of different reasons from your DNA there's not only epigenetic factors like methylation and a Siddeley ssin but there are also factors like certain sugars that are attached to your DNA post-processing or at least for certain RNA and proteins that might be evident in synthetic DNA yes oh okay any any more questions about like yes but if you're talking about the
Instagram selfie is being like a singular point data wouldn't have 3d information right how reliable would it be to Paul to that information from a single picture already have to correlate several to sort of a triangulated 3d image from an entire Instagram account oh yeah you'll have to have a lot of so the question was about the difference between hierarchical spectral clustering and like stereo imagery as opposed to your run-of-the-mill Instagram photo and the answer is that although currently with like small populations and small ends you need this stereo spectral like photography when you have enough information you can actually have some sort of like mapping or projection from different I guess not planes but like mapping from different forms of photography so you can have the mapping of these stereo images to the mapping of iPhone 10 images to the mapping of just regular photography right if you have enough data in each form so yes it doesn't really like currently it does matter that you're using stereo imagery but in a future where you have enough information like enough photos it doesn't matter yes so the next time you go to a daze you may be able to find the DNA profile over there tension does it so the the note the comment was about dating and how you can actually genetically discriminate against your dates sounds like a startup idea guys yes so if FPR only uses 13 sites doesn't that make it a lot cheaper if all if you know that the police are going to use STR so the thing about STR is that they're looking at 13 particular sites and it is not just snip reads but it's like it's not single reads but it's multiple reads of sticky ends of DNA and the way that works is that you have an enzyme and an enzyme will cut at a particular string of DNA and then figure out you'll figure out like the lengths of all these cuts in order to describe what the identity of this person is so you're like even if you only so I think what you're getting at in your question his question was about STR and how it's only 13 sites and how maybe you could only like affect these 13 sites and it'd be very cheap but any sort of perturbation beyond the 13 sites or any sort of difference beyond the 13 sites might accidentally get cut by these enzymes and then it'll be in the read yeah that's what any sort of like restriction enzyme digests that like even if you affect certain places where you think it's going to cut the other variation might not be enough mm-hmm mm-hmm so everyone's scared yes they're testing to have no you don't okay so this is really this is really effed up so when I read it I was like oh my god so the question was about whether you need a perfect match in order to implicate someone in crime and the answer is no because oftentimes the sequencing has high enough variation and enough areas that you know good enough is good enough unfortunately yep so even if it's 13 sites they might only need like 10 to like implicate you in a crime yes so the question was about how you can in court of law get a better genetic test in order to get higher fidelity like matching for the crime and it might come down to mr. Brimley's point of money and I'm not quite sure how the courts handled that exactly any comments from the audience any lawyers yes so I think in that case you're trying to prove the prove the government wrong so I think a big and I get access to this and so the answer is that the it comes down to proving the government wrong and you might not be able to get the tests today today yeah okay paraphrasing nice did you did you hear that answer okay so to clarify it comes down to how the court proceeded and how your access is to whatever they had yes California stuff like this this guy this is pretty good
another question firms a lot of these [Music] from international sources okay so the comment was about those are comment not a question right maybe it's just the legality of things I'm not I'm not an expert on international law so I can't answer that question the question was about how how you would litigate in an international off source how it should be regulated yeah well currently and certain like clinical settings you can't export any DNA and then for government regulations like in China for example you can't export any genetic information or if you do what they do and China is they take the like server that has all the genetic information or the hard drive and they ship it over and they send over like some sort of Chinese custodian who will watch you as you do whatever genetic analysis and they'll like take this device back because they don't trust any sort of like FTP or whatever yeah and that funny like if you're having a coordination between China and Canada they'll like fly over this like giant machine looked like you know someone who like custodians and like watches you yep super safe though I guess yes that question Oh what the golden snake killer well I had a note about this carpenter versus the United States that the police needed a warrant to obtain information on the location of an individual and phones from a phone company so I think it has been upheld maybe I'm not quite sure what it helped held Mayan notes are not that clear but there is some stuff happening federally yes okay sorry I'm not an expert of law I'm just a computational biologist who has a lot of paranoia okay any other questions comments sure what about your brother Breanna not take that data and make 3d representations to falsify a video oh okay so taking genetic information and turning into facial information right that is extremely difficult because from the sequencing information there's not a lot of for whatever reason the mapping is not like equally equal both ways I like if you're going from genetic information to facial information they're a couple of different things like one your face is weathered by whatever you've experienced in your life and it's not reflected in your genetic nor at the genetic information to a certain degree and then like to the like whatever sequencing you're using usually is not high depth enough to like account for whatever error to accurately represent your face [Applause]
Feedback