It WISN't me, attacking industrial wireless mesh networks

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Video in TIB AV-Portal: It WISN't me, attacking industrial wireless mesh networks

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It WISN't me, attacking industrial wireless mesh networks
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nixu cybersecurity.
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Wireless sensor networks are commonly thought of as IoT devices communicating using familiar short-range wireless protocols like Zigbee, MiWi, Thread and OpenWSN. A lesser known fact is that about a decade ago, two industrial wireless protocols (WirelessHART and ISA100.11a) have been designed for industrial applications, which are based on the common IEEE 802.15.4 RF standard. These Wireless Industrial Sensor Networks (WISN) are used in process field device networks to monitor temperature, pressure, levels, flow or vibrations. The petrochemical industry uses WISN in oil and gas fields and plants around the world. Both IEC ratified standards have been commonly praised by the ICS industry for their security features, including strong encryption on multiple layers within the protocol stack, resistance to RF interference, and replay protection. While the standards in general look safe on paper, there are potential interesting attack vectors that require verification. However, security research so far has not yielded any significant results beyond basic attack vectors. Often these attacks have only been theorized, and not (publically) demonstrated. In addition, vendor implementations have not been thoroughly tested for security by independent third parties, due to protocol complexity and the lack of proper (hardware/software) tools. We strongly believe in Wright's principle,"Security does not improve until practical tools for exploration of the attack surface are made available."
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so it's over the math today let's give him a big DEFCON welcome okay Minori good morning all thanks for being here early for some of you who don't have kids yet so just a quick introduction so I mean that's metallus or math if you may want to call them we both work at next shoe which is a Finnish company but we actually work for the Dutch branch office so we're based in Amsterdam as you can see it took us quite some some time to get here so what is it what we kind of talked about well we kind of talked about what if industrial sensor networks but it's always good to look back like what has been done before as you can see the earliest research was already done in 2009 more academic research about potential attacks and the attacks were were that were described but not demonstrated there was no information how you could actually recreate the attack yourself and there's and that sort of continues because then in 2015 it was actually PhD student in the Netherlands who did also similar research and actually tried to build a tool to to interact with these networks and he did not really succeed I was using SDR based systems initially in the end he didn't really succeed in actually capturing traffic or traffic or modifying traffic so then we came along and we did a presentation at the s4 and then we already opted the idea to actually create a toolkit to be able to actually capture traffic inject traffic etc that's a couple of years ago but unfortunately we never got around to actually doing it because we soon left the company working at at that time and in the meantime we had we had Blake Johnson again using SDR based approach to interact with these networks but again no code was released no tools nothing so I mean these networks are around for quite a while but still there are no tools and we strongly believe in in Wright's principle which is written down there the guy Joshua right who actually said that well if there are no tools security will not improve so we have we were actually attending Def Con last years and it's just and not a speaker but it's a regular fishermen like well let's build those tools because it's still missing and just to give you an idea what a button just roll revolution is for this type of system so first we're talking about industrial control systems here so first we had at the air pressure systems in 1940s and 1950s they start using analog current loops in the meantime I'm well familiar with that part because it actually allowed me to destroy some of the the components we were testing but later on they actually started creating digital protocols so on top of the current loop they they implement for instance the heart protocol which you may be familiar with or not and and in late 2000s they thought well let's do it Wireless and they created two standard wireless heart and a 111 a commonly names as I said 100 Joe is anybody familiar with this protocols I've ever heard about it no not of many okay well so it's for most people it's very niche but I've still it's it's interesting and if you're wondering where where these systems are being used for instance oil and gas fields you can see those transmitters so you see the the blue ones there they're actually field devices so those are transmitters and they're actually measuring things like a pressure or temperature and that transmit wirelessly to to the central system so we get to
that what's in it and industrial control loop process control loop I think it's good to sort of explain how that works so basically you have a flow transmitter all the way on the right and there's a signal being sent to a central controller and that for instance indicates the flow rate that's called the process value and that process value is actually checked against set points and and if it's within green range nothing happens but if if something needs to happen there's actually control output so that's the bottom line and then the valve is actually changed from from open or close to to adjust the flow and so this is the typical process loop and what you see is that typically up till now mainly the measuring part is done Wireless either with wireless heart or highs 100 so if you look a bit a bit
more at wireless heart it's actually the same heart protocol the application layer but they created a wireless large stack for it so it's compatible with with the heart devices out there it does use encryption so it's not the most insecure control protocol but it's symmetric encryption and we get to that in the later slides a bit more it's based on on wireless technology from from DOS networks because they are also the ones creating the the radios so the radium system on the chip and and you see there's there's there's a couple of vendors who actually build equipment for for wireless heart so I saw under there are fewer companies actually supporting it as a main driver if Yokogawa and also honeywell and there's actually a whole bunch of standards it's it's it's based on so there's a six slope/w pen there's ipv6 surprisingly and UDP on on top of that and it's it allows you to tunnel under other protocols so it's not like they took an existing protocol with what as with wireless hard and build water stack for it but you're able to to tunnel and so it's more gender neutral and the mainly it's developed by a company called Nitish who created the system on the chip initially but now there are more chips out there from from different vendors so what does
a typical topology look like what these are mesh networks so there is not other Asia central system that orchestrates the mesh that's the gateway network marriage nears the security manager typically that's just one box one device as you can see on the right butters their field devices out there and there's there's a couple of different ones you can see in the picture so you have to peel divide search devices that actually measure stuff that have a wireless transmitter themselves or you have the situation references where you have a heart heart enabled transmitter and then you can add an adapter and they can communicate but since it's a wireless mesh network also the few devices can route traffic for other devices it's not point-to-point only and you have on the the right hand side you have the wireless heart handheld and that's being used to actually configure the devices so before they can join the network you have to configure them and then they will join the network so if
you look at the protocol stacks you can see that that on the heart side there's actually on the left hand side you can actually see the the the traditional heart and and on the right hand side you see the wireless heart so it's basically idea to 15.4 but they they used only a very thin layer of that protocol but everything they build on top specifically wireless and what is hard and and one of the things to look to pay attention to is the channel hopping because we get back to that later that that's something that was challenging to to solve and also on the ice on their side we see a similar thing so it's again thin 802 15 to 4 layer and then you see the whole protocol stack on top with a UDP etc etc and although it's not listed in this in its overview they also do channel hopping as well so to summarize to the
similarities because we have two wireless protocols out there which somewhat similar and we thought well can we build to kill to actually assess both of those of those systems so they both have the dead shared 8215 at four layer although they both have different versions of portion and they're both work at 2.4 gigahertz and above the time slot the channel hopping and and the reason they do that I certa hop from channel all the time and the reason I do that is actually to minimize interference because she I mean these systems are being used in in plants and industrial sites there is a lot of interference from other systems that are and that are out there and also to to mitigate multipath fading so that means that if and signal gets reflected back you might cancel out the signal and because you hope the channels you actually prevent that because there's a lot of metal around large large storage containers etc other there's a lot of reflections so they both have a central networking security manager to orchestrate the communication between the nodes that doesn't mean that notes itself can also route traffic for other nodes but there is a central point that controls the network so we thought well we can probably build a sniffer for both protocols so we if you look a bit more
at the things that shares that they had actually used this exact same e yes CCM star encryption so at the network layer they use it for integrity only so either to the 54 is only but at the transport layer that they apply encryption and both systems have actually a joint process where you they actually shared an encryption key and that's a handshake with the network manager so that's the central component and for wireless heart it's it's it's my only shared secrets so that's really an interesting thing yeah symmetric encryption so how do you get the key across and where do you store it and and I say 100 also sports difficut although we haven't seen it being used so this are they the ice 100 supports both shared secrets and certificates and there's a lot of different keys so if we started at the left you have to ice 100 the the top three keys are actually used during during the provisioning face so you have to kelabra key the key open key global and and during the provisioning finish the master key is being is being shared and and from that master key they derived two key is the D key in the T key it's not so important that you remember all the different keys is just to show there's a lot of different keys out there and shames through for Wildheart so the well-known key is used at at the network layer that's actually live encryption keep an altercation key because they don't do encryption in the network layer and and there's a network key than the join key for the joint which is being shared during the joint process and derived from that first two session keys so about for broadcast and unicast so first question of course is how do you get key material one of the things you could do is actually read documentation because there's a lot of devotees out there and I must admit that since we've done the research two years ago a lot of the documentation is not publicly available anymore because we back then already published some of the keys that are default keys and seems a lot of the documents have vanished so not all the keys we list here you can still publicly find but we're sure that we initially found them somewhere and I saw hundreds specifically also has over-the-air professional of devices that's also a weak part where you could sniff could sniff the transaction or the handshake but then you need to be able to sniff of course and previous research we've done we actually took apart transmitters and looked at if we could interface directly with with a radio shock because actually there's multiple components and there is already a short on there and it turned out that there actually had jtech spi enabled at least four four four wireless heart because back then we only looked at wireless heart and we showed that you could actually sort of locate where the encryption key is and and worst case you can always dump the complete murmur and loaded onto another similar device and then you can also join the network so there's a couple of ways to actually obtain those keys so if you if you are a plant manager and getting rid of old equipment also pay attention to the last one because you might not erase those keys and if it ends up on eBay somebody might buy it so there's a couple of default keys for wireless heart we haven't located any default keys for highest 100 yet so that's why mahoney lists wireless smart keys the first one you see a lot and that's actually has to do with with dust networks who create the socks and that's why they used us does network rock all at a lot of locations so it's it's a you can see it's a 16 bytes hexadecimal hexadecimal key so it's quite long but you can see they use a couple of values out there and and the third one the Emerson one is also interesting because that's taken from an emerson wireless heart gateway and if you do a factory reset it actually sets the key like this so you see a lot of zeros so this key space is really really small so if you ever have reset those devices and use the default key you might be able to easily brute force it and and sometimes you can see it says the name of defender so the last one is actually exactly anderson house but an axe so if we look at the sniffer
hardware we first looked what's out there because we we want to build something new and and during previous research we use the beam logic which basically is just a sniffer but it sniffs on all 16 channels simultaneously so it has now an injected support very basic Wireshark the sector and it's quite expensive it's the Box on the on the right so yeah its expensive and also have quite limited what you can do with it initially we thought about using the Admiral RC Dre RC raven stick because also the regular transmitters used using AVR based system but already reached end-of-life and it's very hard nowadays to find at new studio somewhere so then we look for other options and we went on to the B kit from NXP MIT for that already allows you to snip on one channel with the standard firmer although the standard firm is not observed but that also reached end-of-life so we continued our search for another one another stick from NXP so this one is still supported as a free IDE and it allows you to sniff on a single Channel it's quite powerful and we need to add for the channel open mattias will explain later and you can actually modify the HB a bit to put an external antenna on it it's extremely small so I already ruined the device trying to do it but it is possible and you could go to our driving yeah there's there's talk with a shin out there and examples but only with a few important emissions here and there
so I just want to show you the default application that that's already provided by them hope you can see it so basically
this is a deal with application you just select a channel so it's sniffing 802 15.4 you can start Wireshark and you can
at least see packets see you can see the packets but if you click on actually on the bottom side you can see that it's just data so it doesn't have a detector for this protocol but the base is there
we can already see a packets on one channel so that's a start so then we
figured out okay how does this actually work because there is a there's a whole SDK around it but actually it is it's relatively simple because the hardware is detected as virtual comport both on Windows and Linux so that's already a plus but they implemented their own protocol which is called FS CI and developed by an XP in a communication protocol offer of serial and there is a host SDK available with Python bindings what we thought well we don't want to ship a tool with the whole host SDK around it we might run into legal issues so can we there are communicate directly and as it turns out we can actually do that so we created a driver for for killer B and Kelly we can directly drive this drive to stick now so we don't need a full SDK anymore so this is what it looks like schematically so the kw4 for ones that is actually the import X there's a second one on there where you can actually load a different boot loaders and that way you can also how provision new the firmware on the device through USB so you actually have two MCU Express how it's called MTU express our IDE and actually allows you to develop saw a firmer for this device so thank you Erin so we wanted to about to build something more powerful than was there so we thought we found our hardware platform that we could develop on so we start building the toolset and
the first thing we wanted to accomplish this I'll sniff the packets ourselves and not relying on the SDK that came along with the hardware so actually we built a driver for the killaby framework killaby because it she has the same RF layered 800 250 not for protocol so that seems quite a good match we also developed extensions to skippy so we were also being able to to inject packets rather than just listening on the traffic and to bring packet sniffing to the masses we also decided to build Wireshark a detectors for protocols wireless heart and eyes I
have 100 so we'll show you a short demo
this in action
so you can see we use the CB wireshark utility that comes with with killaby and
here you see we are picking up traffic in this case eyes are one hundreds and you see also the Wireshark the secretary in action on the left the screen you see we decode to the packets so the next
challenge was the channel hopping problem so like Aaron told the protocol uses a fast paced channel hopping algorithm and when starting developing and studying this toolkit okay there is a new extension for 82 15.4 if I remember correctly that's the D amendments which also uses times for some hopping mechanism so we thought well maybe we could use that because that primitive wasn't already supported by by the SDK but it turned out that that was not usable at all so we really got to get our hands dirty and rights you know pretty extension to the firmware itself so none of us having an embedded development background but it turns out to be quite a challenge so if I mean the fast paced channel hopping that means that the intervals you see here on this slide at 10 milliseconds so every 10 milliseconds you get the frequency change so in order to keep up you have to think through how you're going to accomplish that as I said yeah
we need to rely on the firmware cellphone the hardware because yes you can can change channels from the host system but as soon as you send an F sei commands through the USB device that Simon the timeslot already has slept so that doesn't work in practice so you really need to implement this in Furman so that we needed to deep dive into embedded developments which was new for us yeah there are a couple of approaches you can take so for this type of devices you can rely on a real-time operating system there are quite a few around one of them is for our toes for instance but there it is it is pretty so it's pretty complex in the sense that it's it's not a full-fledged operating system but it has a task scheduler that will preempt so that means that it will interrupt your code right in the middle of of your function and you can get all kinds of challenges like race conditions you have to deal with so you need to mess around with the semaphores and outer synchronization mechanisms the other approach is use a bare-metal task scheduler the that will not interrupt right into your code section but as soon as the task scheduler and is running your code you're responsible for releasing resources so what that means that in practice you have to make sure that your cro doesn't run for longer than two milliseconds otherwise you will starve you will starve other tasks and that means that for instance there's a separate tasks for collecting the packets yeah you can make sure that you change channels but if you don't pick up the Bacchus you don't have anything at all so as I said yeah it requires quite some discipline and in programming well the the upside is that you can achieve fast execution because you don't have the overhead of a real-time operating system so this is what it looks like these are the modules in their firmware a part is offered by the framework itself so you have management a task that is taking care of allocating the heap and stuff you have the mech fire layer that's taking care of picking up the packets from the radio and the serial manager obviously because these beggars need to go to the host you have a bunch of timers which come program and will wake your tasks so you can do actually something useful this is Becca's and of course everybody needs blinky lives so on the right side you see actually what we needed to do the Mac file layer was only partially useful we needed to implement the channel hopping and yeah that is now called the Mac extension layer because we needed to obviously extend these capabilities on top of the ads we actually get to the industry of protocols as a 100 and wireless heart and we also needed to parse information out of these packets on that layer because we needed information in order to calculate one the particular time slot occurs while you're interested in so how to do this 10 milliseconds if you program a timer to to wake up your tasks every 10 milliseconds we found out that you're always too late because you will never be aren t to get a wake-up call within every 10 milliseconds it's a 13 10 milliseconds or 11 or 12 and when you start tuning into the channel you are too late so what we did is we passed the packets that came along so in the advertisements of both wireless protocol you'll get information where the slots of interest are for example the join slots these are the time slots where few devices actually can tune into to start a handshake for getting onto the network those are particular interest also from a tech perspective so what we started to do is well tune in advance so if our the tuning code gets called we measure okay the the next slot of interest is three time salsa way okay what's you in in right now and well the the other task will take out picking up the packets there so that gives us some more room like for instance around 40 milliseconds rather than 10 milliseconds so that turned out to work pretty well and we'll
show you how we actually achieve channel hopping
again zeebee zeebee wireshark we had to heck in a non-existing channel see
general zero means that we activate the channel hopping in the firmware and as you can see we get quite some more traffic here than in the first case why we only were tuned into one particular channel and I don't know it's readable but here you can see that on the left part that we actually hope two different channels so what can you do if you can't
you know these intervals of interest these times Falls well these are a few attacks that have been theorized and now we can execute in practice one is just you miss this signal by sending a garbage to on a particular channel and you can block for example advertisements and if you do that successfully no new devices can join the network because I don't they they are not able to synchronize with the network or even existing fuel devices will lose at some point the synchronization with the network so in practice that means that the fuel devices are unable to send their process values and you know depending on on what control system you have you can never it have work of course being able to inject traffic you can also transmit fake advertisements so you can and has fuel devices to join your network rather than the existing network and yeah we'll give a short
demonstration of how you can Jim no yeah
okay so here's here see the victim was
happily receiving advertisements and we
turned to the attacker which will start our tool to jam the signal we found the network and when we click insights you see a few pick is coming in and next it comes to a health silence so
that's all nice that we can do things without actually being on the network but suppose you have some I gather some keys or you found these in the manuals or you brute force ease well you can do all other nasty stuff the way this works is that the encryption actually is derived from unknown set has for large part predictable values so there is a in the advertisement data there is a counter that you need and that can be snipped from the network without being authenticated but even if you don't know how to you can mess with this nomes value because there is replay there is a replay protection in place that's supposed to to protect against obviously replaying fake values but the thing is if you mess with the nonce and you'll I guess of shallots and notes and it will be picked up by by the device if its larger it say it's much larger larger than the time stamp that is currently in the network that will really reject all decals from Vela devices so you can really bring down and turn entire sensor network this way of course if you also have access to other key material for example when capturing a joint process and you have access to the session keys you are free to to mimic real few device and you can really mess with process values and that's where it's getting really scary so to summarize what did we learn along your route this this net these sensor protocols are highly unexplored area and as we as in the introduction we suspect that it's mainly due to the fact that no we'll we'll go tools exist so yeah we picked up their tasks and hope that we will we can promote other researches to to explore this in a very interesting area so yeah we intend to so release the toolset we created and yeah another thing we want to until give to the assets on us for we who deploy these systems we see a trends that that people are getting very confident with this technology because it's around for ten years and it has never been hacked so must be secure right so you see a trend that these protocols are not only being used for monitoring systems but also for control yeah I would like to probably that's not a real good idea so they might want to reconsider that all right we have some time for questions five minutes Isis this is these are the future research of these other fridge topics we want to expand upon so will support more attacks that have been theorized so far but no ruling exists we want to create support for wardriving initial networks when we did order the hard way we were happy to see that it had an external antenna connector but once it arrived it was not on the board so you're kind of disappointed and of course with the capability of actually interacting with this network and the capability of injecting packets the other we are free to actually fast these particles from the radio side of of these systems okay well thank you for your attention and we can take some questions [Applause] [Applause]