Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation

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Video in TIB AV-Portal: Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation

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Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation
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CC Attribution 3.0 Unported:
You are free to use, adapt and copy, distribute and transmit the work or content in adapted or unchanged form for any legal purpose as long as the work is attributed to the author in the manner specified by the author or licensor.
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2013
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English

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Abstract
Solar geoengineering is the deliberate reduction in the absorption of incoming solar radiation by the Earth's climate system with the aim of reducing impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Climate model simulations project a diversity of regional outcomes that vary with the amount of solar geoengineering deployed. It is unlikely that a single small actor could implement and sustain global-scale geoengineering that harms much of the world without intervention from harmed world powers. However, a sufficiently powerful international coalition might be able to deploy solar geoengineering. Here, we show that regional differences in climate outcomes create strategic incentives to form coalitions that are as small as possible, while still powerful enough to deploy solar geoengineering. The characteristics of coalitions to geoengineer climate are modeled using a 'global thermostat setting game' based on climate model results. Coalition members have incentives to exclude non-members that would prevent implementation of solar geoengineering at a level that is optimal for the existing coalition. These incentives differ markedly from those that dominate international politics of greenhouse-gas emissions reduction, where the central challenge is to compel free riders to participate.
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Climate Global warming
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middle or the central challenge in the international politics of greenhouse gas mitigation is getting all the players to participate in power basically to prevent free free-riding when it comes to solar geoengineering or the reduction of solar radiation to reduce some of the
impacts of greenhouse gas I cause global warming of the challenges might be different and in order to compare the challenges so as you have international politics of mitigation and those of geology and we developed as a game-theoretic model myself and my colleagues 1 Marino Cruz and Kent Kodaira the where we looked at the results of UN open membership coalition game and an exclusive coalition game to compare the benefits to different players under those 2 games game illustrates these incentives to
exclude by comparing the benefits to 22 regions when solar geoengineering coalitions are formed through an exclusive membership game versus an open membership game we examine the results of the Geim over a number of decades of geoengineering and over different power metrics for example PA-based based on economic output and power this population you can see in these figures the benefits in 1 game to the regions in the winning coalition shown in blue of excluding the non-members shown in red from the implementation decisions about geoengineering relative power in a region is illustrated here by the size of the bubble we found that the that the members of the winning coalition change changes with these different power metrics and over 2 different decades and with different climate damage functions when you allow transfers between coalition members in the game there's always an exclusive coalition that all the Members before over the open membership coalition any other potential exclusive quotients as well but they're
always incentives for her players in geoengineering coalitions to exclude people on and this is because that physical climate effects of geoengineering had a genius and engineering it's cheap compared to mitigation in which town mitigations expensive but everyone wants the same amount of mitigation
which is just as much as possible and so we use this game to illustrate these major differences between the incentives in international politics of you greenhouse gas mitigation we do or
how to so what we found there
was all I
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