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Memory attacks on device-independent quantum

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Title Memory attacks on device-independent quantum
Title of Series The Annual Conference on Quantum Cryptography (QCRYPT) 2012
Number of Parts 30
Author Colbeck, Roger
Contributors Centre for Quantum Technologies (CQT)
National University of Singapore (NUS)
License CC Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives 2.5 Switzerland:
You are free to use, copy, distribute and transmit the work or content in unchanged form for any legal and non-commercial purpose as long as the work is attributed to the author in the manner specified by the author or licensor.
DOI 10.5446/36666
Publisher Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH) Zürich
Release Date 2012
Language English

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Subject Area Information technology
Abstract Device-independent quantum cryptographic schemes aim to guarantee security to users based only on the output statistics of any components used, and without the need to verify their internal functionality. Since this would protect users against untrustworthy or incompetent manufacturers, sabotage or device degradation, this idea has excited much interest, and many device-independent schemes have been proposed. Here we identify a critical weakness of device-independent quantum cryptographic protocols that rely on public communication between secure laboratories. Untrusted devices may record their inputs and outputs and reveal information about them via publicly discussed outputs during later runs. Reusing devices thus compromises the security of a protocol and risks leaking secret data. Possible defences include securely destroying or isolating used devices. However, these are costly and often impractical. We briefly consider other possible defences available in scenarios where device reuse is restricted.

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