Merken

Autopsy of a slow train wreck: The life and death of a Django startup

Zitierlink des Filmsegments
Embed Code

Automatisierte Medienanalyse

Beta
Erkannte Entitäten
Sprachtranskript
and from the and and
I and
IV and so yes my name is Russell give day and
you've probably heard by name before I am an almost 12 year veteran of the Jagger quoting president of the Genghis of foundation from 2011 to 2015 and as as she said so uh along governed while the title of most attended and having attended region on US and if you don't need 1 of those
jagged columns in the last 6 years old saying big generally I I probably would introduce myself as the CTR and cofounder of trains cloud Strange cloud was a software as a service company for tradespeople plumbers electricians carpenters been like that trains cloud was my up and I say was because in January of this year my business partner I close the doors and try clouds which shut down the service as an industry where it
really fond of promoting the glossy side it's not that of plucky bunch of engineers can take an idea a personal credit cards and build entire business empire drive after sunset gold-plated limiting East and yes those like by as you go and the gold-plated remedies actually do exist is even a couple of them in the gender community the unicorns topical but on the but it's important to remember that the stories are unit costs they're not the normal started experience for most people
In the VC-backed start world the general expectation is if the VC firm invests in 20 companies only 1 of them will actually succeed spectacularly fall will have some sort of exit that leads results of a break even financially but 50 make expect 5th thing to file are fraught with significant will complete financial loss interestingly this isn't something that you need to take a detector that I'm much grander scale especially when the sales are involved but open any small business advice book the sort that is targeted at the planners and artisans of the world and build more that 50 % of this is filed in their 1st year and yet despite the fact this failure happens all the time we don't talk about we don't talk about why things file and as a result many of the same lessons end up having to be learned over and over again both of those that experienced fighting often feel like they're doing a line because of the significant social stigmas associated with so this is my small attempts to restore that balance is talk about electrodes that my file business traits cloud was a slow train wreck we survived for 6 years almost to the diet and we had plenty of optimism the success was just around the corner that never quite happy but what was
tries what prompted me to dedicate 6 years of my life to it well it started as a problem that I thought I could solve if you find yourself needing a on how you pick 1 well 15 years ago when I 1st had the idea for what became traits class the best option was opening a fine book and looking for the brightest Chinese had maybe arranging a couple quotes pity 1 basically a random if you're really lucky you might have a no use Google more likely in the US and Australia but it was still looking for was basically the Chinese that if they turn out to be good good well that's but you probably won't need another clamor for a while so that knowledge is almost useless and affectionately also will become more anyone off either there has to be a better way and of course I did nothing about it and I say nothing I did start tinkering around with this web framework may have heard of that called Django and I originally got involved in the gender project because I wanted to add aggregation functions to the origin so that I can compute average ratings of plants and and in 2008 I'm into a students because lot to value-added aggregation Summer of Code project so success that then into like 2010 and it up with a former boss for a drink and he tells me that his brother his brother on the Pascal pest-control company in Australia whimpers and he had the same problem but from a different angle uh I'm looking for trades people in my area that can be recommended he is a small a pest control company that was to compete with the big players the shiny adds a based upon the quality of the services they could provide and so transcribers law we have an idea at the time that he wasn't even Coltrane's clouds cold clever pages because it was going to be a clever yellow pages any must be a time we start hacking together proof concept that was my 1st perspective and the 1st mistake that most oriented people might as much as gender sells itself as a rapid development framework entities any non-trivial project still takes up time and if and I spend a couple of months of spare time hacking together a proof of concept German military strategist telephone Malka was noted that node battle plan survives 1st contact with the enemy or in non-military terms scholarship already burns the best laid schemes of mice and men gang aft the blank and so it is with business ideas all the time that I spent working on an initial part I could've eliminated it actually on the trouble speaking to a plumber 1st just because we had an idea and I can implement the idea in software that in mainly we had a good business idea is that we had a good idea for a hobby project and the difference is crucial a business is an idea that generates revenue a hobby project may be fun to work on it might even be useful for other people but if you can't sell something if you can't pay the bills that revenue isn't a business and conflating the 2 ideas is a major problem what we should done 1st is validate the idea and but we need to do that and when I finally had some initial off my business partner over the local newspaper picked a bunch of of planners and colder than at the so this grand new idea we had their parts I and he called 10 planners 5 of them suggested that the place that idea in an anatomically impossible locations a floor of them had a secretariat provide exactly the same advice yeah but what Mama did sound interested and he said he would have a chat this was a mistake and the true or at the very least it should be a warning flag at the end of the day a business is about selling something selling of physical product a subscription in a service what is doing is selling something and or still something you have to have customers if all your prospective customers hang up when you call you have a problem you don't have a sales channel it doesn't matter if you got a machine that translating the gold if you can't get that idea in front of people who are going to buy your product you might as well shut up shop right now the fact it was very difficult to get plumbers to answer the following should have been a warning sign that perspective audience wasn't going to be easy to correct even if we had a perfect that technical solution but we persisted and we had a chat with the 1 plumber who would actually speak to us so media pitch and he said no but interest but if you can make that paper disappear I'll give you as much money as you want this was a conversation that set the direction of a company the years to come was this a mistake or a success well that's a little hard to judge there is an extent to which we change direction because it was the only direction that seemed open to its which in itself is a bad but it was also a very lucrative directions or maybe it's a watch what we identified in this conversation was a significant is this problem a business process that was being performed manually and it took 3 hours a day to perform and I don't if we identified a simple and reliable way that could be automated we identified a couple other business processes that we go what might away and report on some key performance indicators business as a result of doing that that got a processing and we identified a path forward their way we could use mobile technology to improve prior process management communication and overall business aka by the time we don't we were done we worked out how to immediately Flickr free up 1 full-time employee with potential for a lot more solid in theory as long as the charge less than the cost of an employee that 50 thousand straight year uh the designer would be ahead of time our costs with next to nothing and you found customer told us the business processes would you 1 specific contract that they had out there many other people all the same contract so it should be easy to take the same software to everybody else on the contract and profit right well OK let's keep it simple of about 50 % saving on what I what they will really spending and build a fancy footwork traversing near good explanation of why that was what we were charging just start making 25 thousand dollars per year per customer right well know that was mistake number 3 the site 3 is that we didn't take into account the human factor In theory anything less than 50 thousand dollars a year short of being rationally underwriter decision it out but we was selling to humans and humans don't ever behave rationally there is an almost Baltimore's body of research about how bad humans are evaluating economic consequences and decisions and so when he walked in the door of a prospective customer we get up pitch and they almost universally 1 away and then we tell them the price and they went back to describing anatomically implausible occasions again 1 well 1st off humans are rational a sale all that sort of 25 thousand dollars a year is an easy asked a plumber spend a hundred dollars a month they know they can afford to be less than what they spend on coffee but also the spin 2 thousand dollars a month that's a lot harder for them to justify that actually starts to make a dent in their border bottom line so they're gonna take some convincing they gonna want some proof that it actually works but it's actually going to deliver the problem that the benefit promising secondly we was selling software while we were completely honorable and completely truthful arrivals and with everything we promised and software made good suddenly appear every time linear we would 1st IT sales person to darken middle and we collectively have a part of an industry that for 40 years has systematically over promised and under delivered what software can do for businesses that's something you need to overcome said we was selling software who here is currently holding a fine was a couple hundred maybe even a thousand dollars through this much everyone in the room now how many of you give more consideration to whether you should buy 99 sit at the new did on the decision the by far almost exactly the same subset that's the problem selling software multiplied by a thousand times when you start dealing with a non take audience we have been conditioned to expect that physical tangible things are expensive but software that should be changed or better still free as a side this is 1 of the major problems we face funding open-source projects as well that's a subject for a completely different rot range uh 1 that I've had of for and comes in if you whatever lastly we were dealing with personal relationships if we walked into a small plumbing business to speak the manager there was an odds-on shots of the bookkeeper or another significant employee the business was the wife of the manager and you start talking about the benefits of being undercut 1 administrative employee you can guess how will that conversation gets and even if tho it
wasn't a family member people don't generally want to fight people they do it's necessary but they like the idea that building this big family the the number 4 happened is the result of an unfortunate coincidence after closing of 1st sale we got that cost about to give us an introduction some other possible customers and he gave us the best option 1st so efforts to for about 2 thousand dollars a month at 3rd bloody 500 dollars a month but they gave us the confidence that we had something that cells both medium and small businesses we closed 3 sales in rapid succession we have 4 and half thousand dollars a month in revenue cells will really painfully fleeting quotes we thought would found a money printing mission and then we hit a wall this you sales calls we made went nowhere never had no ability of uh is as the price we have to think about it and bounces up and my and my my wife to have waited we confused initial success with a pattern that was going to continue after 3 sales in less than a month we essentially didn't close another firefight months and that's not a good sign now arguably we did get bitten by circumstances that when you have lots of early success it's easy to think that success is going to be ongoing and it very difficult to be objective and that's what you need to be if you can't consistently close sales of you can't reliably predict your close right you have a problem the 2nd 5 I was completely our fault we completely filed the basic math out value proposition of the business process that we had optimized existed because the processes required by 1 particular high maintenance contract uh at pricing scheme is simple we 1 dollar per job completed an initial customer that about 2 thousand of the most so we charge them 2 thousand dollars a month which is great because it also have to be almost exactly the 50 % savings target we originally identified what we didn't do was add up how many jobs that actually were in the system and it turns out that with we had managed to close every company on that contract we still would have only generated 12 thousand dollars a month in revenue which sounds like a lot especially when you cost from hosting the cloud is a software that doesn't have you a huge a huge traffic requirements but at costs were we also had 2 founders who were full time and the need to be paying and then right if will fully paid was closer to 22 thousand dollars a month and this led to this mistake of 6 we didn't have my business partner I didn't have a serious pricing discussion until it was way too light misled by our initial success at pricing was essentially determined by taking a burn right and working backwards not forwards from what the market would bear my cofounder and I would end up having regular discussions about pricing but almost discussions happened against the back a discussion of how we going to make payroll is which is the wrong time to be having a discussion because 2 important options drastically reducing the price and shouting and the company are effectively off the table so we had a product was too expensive to sell and market wasn't big enough and now the good news was that the paperwork production each that we found that wasn't unique to that 1 contract but they want their many other similar contracts with very similar but they work requirements but we found the thousand pound gorilla in the market other contracts was similar the play with processes with slightly differently to be customized for each contract and that would have been a problem if we hadn't made the statement said we never established a sales channel we got our 1st cial almost by accident we bumped into a customer who gave us the opportunity subsequent sales kind mostly by word of mouth word of mouth is an incredible sales channel if you can get but as a result we never cracked the most important problem how do we sell to someone who hasn't heard of this how do we get in the door how do we establish trust and as a result as files were essentially constrained by the personal networks of our existing customers the person where I come from is a small geographically isolated city when we had exhausted the personal networks we hadn't learn the most important thing how to sell a product to someone who didn't give us a personal introduction adjust Wolski once noted that there's no software product price between a thousand dollars and 100 thousand dollars this is because apart the costs less than a thousand dollars can be bought the Kronecker but if software costs more than something that can be hidden on expense statement you need have sales people and that means you have to pay them and the Commission's and pay for the steak dinners and the drinks they used to close the sale we had a product that was squarely in the stands on it is too expensive to be a casual poker purchase but not expensive enough to support the sales process that it needed if test that a serious problem once we close the style we had almost 0 turn right the only customers we ever lost with because the business actually shut down or they drop the contract where we offered any sort of commercial advantage or we didn't have before we never really established was a good way to prove to new customers that we were indeed that do it wasn't a good or easy way to trial trades class we were managing processes that wrote the call other trades business those processes have to work and they can be duplicated double that Diego you're doubling the paperwork a doubling overhead so there was no way to sort of stick a toe in the water you had the jumping will stay at and since we have a huge price tag most people were conservative and say not they got a recommendation from someone I knew was a little bit easier but if I didn't exist we have a problem and in order to close the people have to believe really believe what you're telling it has to be obvious and undeniable that you will give them the benefit of promising or the cost of trying has to be vastly less than the cost of software itself In our even if we drop the price of a software to your we still didn't have 0 cost because the cost of institutional process change associated with adopting a new piece of software that is that represents the core business operations that huge our best salesperson was completely accidental he wasn't even our employee he was employed the changed employers about every 6 months he was another management yeah a reputation the getting things done and turning companies around and so we kept getting punched and it's in the benefits of traits that 1 contract so he was when he when he got moved to the next 1 is I had at reduced rates that they have a reduced rates class and because he was known around the industry may be higher because he knew what he was talking about his word was extremely valuable when he said this is good people believed in his work was trust but even when we did make a silent mistakes didn't stop mistake number I we didn't pay enough attention to onboarding new customers a sale for part particularly subscription service prior is employed when the contract is signed when the when the user gives you the critical it's close when the person who uses the software has accepted into their daily lives because that's what prevents chair if you say you're selling a small personal told the person who buys it the personal use that probably the same person that allocates the purchase decision was very rarely made by the person who actually had to use the software on the ground in the back and you have to get those people on board to if anything they're more important because they're the ones who are gonna make the bosses life a living hell the software that they have been forced to use is doing the job all words is doing the job too well over over we sort internal sabotage when tribes that rolled adding companies people would simply refuse to change processes and I would find any excuse all the we doesn't work so we had to go back to the menu all the transcribers down again it was like I could that could act as a left and after model to the boss within call us and say want of benefits you promise decidua down last friday so and we were not there last friday you guys were getting the site by the way he is the logs of all the had from your your employees last but I did matter because they only got the benefits of the use the software they were using the software so they were getting the benefit so they weren't happy that paying for what we learned the hard way is that you have to sell the business owner but you also have to sell to the users if you're dealing with with software there's a key part of business process change management is key you have to show the people using the software have more tool helps them do what they currently do by hand you have to show them that their jobs aren't at rates the 1st employee whose 3 hour day task we replaced she wasn't 5 she was redeployed inside the business she went from doing a mindless offers task for most of the day and you can start expanding into other parts of business about 2 years after the 1st deployed traits that she was running accounts and play a role in the company but despite all these mistakes have been
made we're I would stumble along will completely funded a self-funded for almost 2 years yes they did mean burning a lot of personal funds and micro friend doing a bunch of consulting on the side which limited how much time could spend doing styles which was its own set of problems but that's just part of the start experience well maybe it's but in retrospect mistake number 9 was an entirely personal 1 I shouldn't have lost as much money on the experiences idea I knew what I considered success criteria the gold-plated limiting is sitting in the driveway but I never consider what my failure criteria would after 2 years I reached a point where my personal financial runway was running at trace clown either needed to start paying a full-time wage or I was in any other continue and that pivot the business fund-raising is a full-time job everything else goes on wholesale support development everything we tried to get this investment the VC in particularly in Perth is is pretty bad eventually manage assigned as secure 250 thousand cash investment from a colleague of my business partner and at a matching funding to restraining government R&D program and that there was another 2 years runway but the way we were in a secure that runway was by changing our tactics instead of going out the individual plumbers we started going after the head contractors the multimillion-dollar facility management companies that were imposing this paid we're going on the smaller companies and we were seldom are really quite story the companies will really really competitive they're all looking that any advantage they can get a slice of a half-percent profit margin and things but also technologically like it's because they are being established companies so we were walking in and promised them on mobile-enabled workforce in real time employee tracking and forced health and safety provisions provision and practices all sorts of things that made them really excited because they could use those features as differentiate against the competition what and his mistake of 10 we forgot who we were and who is selling to it we was selling the multimillion-dollar companies the reason these companies are technological like that's their conservative they don't take risks is no incentive for an individual employee and a multimillion-dollar company to take any risks and so they consistently might safe decisions when they adopt new technology don't just pick something they put out to tender make it more be its in the name of it is coming to the head office and interrogate them and eventually after 6 months they take someone the safe option we go into a tendering process with almost every major facility management company in Australia the tendering process almost always started because we pitched them the idea of providing traits that subcontractors what they heard was provides software to as subcontractors and so at the end of a six-month training uh tendering process bold trips are uh across the country on on flights and staying in long day interviews and meetings in writing in the papers and so on we were told every time without fault we prefer your technological solution but we gonna go your competitor because your just too risky a two-person company was too much of a risk for multi million dollar company you trust among affected the minute you sign a multimillion-dollar contract you see the cheapest encompass so after 2 years of trying to tactic being turned down by pretty much every facility management company in Australia that money was running out again and not build up a cache buffer again uh in between failing to sell the multinational companies we'd accidentally found a little bit of success selling to small facility management companies in large construction companies and the good news of these companies were big enough that when they bought software they on customized to exactly what they want so as well as the 2 thousand dollars a month so willing to pay that pay 40 50 thousand dollars up front so that everything match the requirements exactly what they want and back that changing along from our investor between making more personal sacrifices we got a cash injection euros stumble along that's this was mistake number 11 we didn't take the heat each 1 of these points we took investment walls potentially a point that would have been a natural place to shut down the business and in retrospect we should have the writing was on the wall the simple truth is if you can't close sales you do not have a business and yeah you can stumble along hoping you gonna find that missing sales ingredient that takes resources it takes money it takes emotional capital as well 1 of the reasons the failure of trades cloud was personally struggling to me is that it didn't file for any reason that I would considered to be my fault from a purely technical perspective we were significantly more reliable than the multinational companies we were integrated we delivered new features in time frames our customers considered inconceivable when I waiting and demonstrations to the multimillion-dollar contractors they expressed doubt that we can actually do what I said we were doing right up until the moment that I showed them doing at life but none of that mattered traits have filed ultimately because we couldn't sell what we had or at least we could sell it in quantities that enabled us to cover our costs and we know they're giving you role and doing things that are being called Magic by prospective customers and you'll still filing that's hard to internalize and when you lie on the fact that a lie on top of that the effect on a husband a father and so income for the family and that introduces all sorts of dupes and fear into the mix and the take all that stress that added along now's the we can work with desperate hope that this will be the thing that saves the company and you start to understand why 2 years ago I had a major depressive episode the statement 12 I lost sight of the fact that quitting is always an option and quitting doesn't mean failure if after 2 years I had taken almost all of way we were as a company and said you know what this is working right I would have 4 years of my life that's for user could something different project but I didn't pay attention more enough attention to my signs I can fly to the success of this company with my own personal success and I lost sight of the fact that know the day it was a job it was then provides an income some intellectual engagement and if it wasn't doing that walking away was always an option but I never really considered that seriously the why not well that's kind of mistake number 13 and was another person a five-year but instead up to my co-founders much I should as a result we waste a lot of time and effort in some cases money now I have to be clear funny because there's a chance that mark when it uses the um but that are not blaming mark you at mark is a great guy he's extremely talented it's got absolutely no shame at funding of the company's thousands of times because these and telling them how they should be doing things he opened doors that I wouldn't even considered knocking on a little on it but he was a real asset that is to say that the failure he was a personal 1 and was mine we didn't go into trades class to play equals now OK sure we were 50 50 pounds of pipe but when I met not he was my 1st Boston University I would see him for 4 years as a relatively junior employee and a lot of that power dynamic remind I let you do a lot of things because well he must know do it I kind of decision because I could see his side and he was more experienced and unfortunately or fortunately but he's a great sales guy he can make you believe in things and he might be believing intrinsically but that's a double-edged sword it got me through all sorts of loans but also meant that I believe in things when I probably should have I should put my foot down and said no more a lot more often than I did but for the benefit of the business and for my own mental health and so when the money ran out for the 3rd time by the model myself had the energy to continue we had a likable last higher last palmeri options we thought 1 as but 1 by 1 they fell through and in the end we were eventually able to pay back the loan our investor but equity investor was essentially lost and in January this year we close was the last time and that's the transplant story now I do want you the plural of anecdote is not data this is my story there are many stories like it this 1 is mine I don't profess to having any particular business inside I just know the trades cladding work and these are the 3rd thing reasons that I can identify why in the aftermath I've had a lot of people many of them in this room who have reached out and given a virtual hogra spoon and many them allows we've was sad to see transcribed God but frankly the emotion that I had was really on January 31st 27 tain I slept like I hadn't slept in the sixties because I knew I was gonna be working up at 2 o'clock in the morning by several and I knew I could sleeping because I was going to get support called 6 o'clock in summer confined on switch on farm the fact that I was even slightly disappointed but not surprised of my life that's the biggest assigned for me but I waited far too long to walk away the good news is the process of
running trades that hasn't burned the out completely it was an amazing money experience and I plan on my theta Jagger con US last year I put my name of adults board sales potentially looking and idea to being a level of half a day before my good friend entropy gum approach means that uh you that Russell the beginning of the other silver lining is the traits that experience drew my attention to problems in the world of all development which is influenced the path of my jointly where I am not be busy trying to work out had tend be wearing the something but this time on a little older and a little dryer hopefully little ones and I should have a better idea of what I'm looking out for you want talk about the where that story from I will be around to the in the brings with on the Web of thanks to revolution systems that we have special contributor coatings but with the man uh so if you 1 all you like to learn when you get 1 by contributing to be with a common gravity effects to give out we also have yet heard coins the people of other people get involved the project so well and and that's that's all of the Senate and the few but this this it we
thank were yeah
Computeranimation
Streuungsdiagramm
Dienst <Informatik>
Einheit <Mathematik>
Wellenpaket
Geschlecht <Mathematik>
Software
Gebäude <Mathematik>
Ganze Funktion
Streuungsdiagramm
Computeranimation
Chipkarte
Resultante
Vektorpotenzial
Einfügungsdämpfung
Umsetzung <Informatik>
Prozess <Physik>
Minimierung
Familie <Mathematik>
t-Test
Fastring
Pascal-Zahlendreieck
Gesetz <Physik>
Computeranimation
Richtung
Homepage
Vorzeichen <Mathematik>
Polygonzug
Fahne <Mathematik>
Minimum
Kontrollstruktur
Gerade
Lineares Funktional
Zentrische Streckung
Pay-TV
Winkel
Güte der Anpassung
Nummerung
Biprodukt
Bitrate
Teilbarkeit
Entscheidungstheorie
Konfiguration <Informatik>
Teilmenge
Software
Dienst <Informatik>
Benutzerschnittstellenverwaltungssystem
Geschlecht <Mathematik>
Datenverarbeitungssystem
Beweistheorie
Projektive Ebene
URL
Schlüsselverwaltung
Mehrwertnetz
Telekommunikation
Subtraktion
Web Site
Wellenpaket
Physikalismus
Digital Rights Management
Klasse <Mathematik>
Automatische Handlungsplanung
Zahlenbereich
Nummerung
Term
Code
Framework <Informatik>
Physikalische Theorie
Virtuelle Maschine
Knotenmenge
Benutzerbeteiligung
Erwartungswert
Spannweite <Stochastik>
Computerspiel
Rationale Zahl
Perspektive
Software
Mittelwert
Indexberechnung
Softwareentwickler
Maßerweiterung
Streuungsdiagramm
Elektronische Publikation
Quick-Sort
Design by Contract
Summengleichung
System F
Flächeninhalt
Hypermedia
Mereologie
Gamecontroller
Streuungsdiagramm
Randverteilung
Resultante
Bit
Konfiguration <Informatik>
Punkt
Prozess <Physik>
Momentenproblem
Virtualisierung
Program Slicing
Programm
Familie <Mathematik>
Schreiben <Datenverarbeitung>
Login
Computeranimation
Eins
Mehrrechnersystem
Regulärer Graph
Vorzeichen <Mathematik>
Prozess <Informatik>
Mustersprache
Mixed Reality
TOE
Softwaretest
Konstruktor <Informatik>
Nichtlinearer Operator
Befehl <Informatik>
Pay-TV
Gebäude <Mathematik>
Systemaufruf
Nummerung
Bitrate
Biprodukt
Konfiguration <Informatik>
Entscheidungstheorie
Softwarewartung
Dienst <Informatik>
Verbandstheorie
Menge
Benutzerschnittstellenverwaltungssystem
Rechter Winkel
Grundsätze ordnungsmäßiger Datenverarbeitung
Ablöseblase
Projektive Ebene
Ordnung <Mathematik>
Overhead <Kommunikationstechnik>
Normalspannung
Schlüsselverwaltung
Tabelle <Informatik>
Subtraktion
Web Site
Wellenpaket
Rahmenproblem
Wasserdampftafel
Mathematisierung
Digital Rights Management
Klasse <Mathematik>
Zellularer Automat
Zahlenbereich
Data Mining
Task
Puffer <Netzplantechnik>
Weg <Topologie>
Differential
Multiplikation
Informationsmodellierung
Computerspiel
Bereichsschätzung
Perspektive
Software
Softwareentwickler
Drei
Schreib-Lese-Kopf
Leistung <Physik>
Soundverarbeitung
Diskretes System
Mathematisierung
Aussage <Mathematik>
Physikalisches System
Elektronische Publikation
Ordnungsreduktion
EINKAUF <Programm>
Quick-Sort
Office-Paket
Design by Contract
Energiedichte
Echtzeitsystem
Caching
Injektivität
Mereologie
Speicherabzug
Wort <Informatik>
Bitrate
Lie-Gruppe
Streuungsdiagramm
Soundverarbeitung
Eindringerkennung
Gravitation
Güte der Anpassung
Physikalisches System
Whiteboard
Übergang
Eins
Thetafunktion
Benutzerbeteiligung
Datenverarbeitungssystem
Rotationsfläche
Projektive Ebene
Entropie
Softwareentwickler
Gerade
Metropolitan area network

Metadaten

Formale Metadaten

Titel Autopsy of a slow train wreck: The life and death of a Django startup
Serientitel DjangoCon US 2017
Teil 41
Anzahl der Teile 48
Autor Keith-Magee, Russell
Mitwirkende Confreaks, LLC
Lizenz CC-Namensnennung - Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen 3.0 Unported:
Sie dürfen das Werk bzw. den Inhalt zu jedem legalen und nicht-kommerziellen Zweck nutzen, verändern und in unveränderter oder veränderter Form vervielfältigen, verbreiten und öffentlich zugänglich machen, sofern Sie den Namen des Autors/Rechteinhabers in der von ihm festgelegten Weise nennen und das Werk bzw. diesen Inhalt auch in veränderter Form nur unter den Bedingungen dieser Lizenz weitergeben.
DOI 10.5446/33179
Herausgeber DjangoCon US
Erscheinungsjahr 2017
Sprache Englisch

Inhaltliche Metadaten

Fachgebiet Informatik
Abstract Everyone knows the story: armed with nothing more than a laptop and a dream, a couple of plucky geeks decide to take on the world: disrupting, innovating, and subverting their way to success. In just a few short months, they take a ramshackle collection of software and turn it into a money-printing factory that enables them to drive off into the sunset in gold-plated Lamborghinis. But it isn’t always like that. In fact, it usually isn’t. Venture Capitalists (VC’s) make their investments betting that 15 out of 20 businesses they invest in will outright fail, 4 will maybe get a payoff, and 1 will be a massive success. We always hear about the 1 - the Facebooks, the Instagrams, the WhatsApps. But we very rarely hear about the 15 that don’t succeed. And that’s only counting the VC-funded companies - there are many other companies that never make it past hobby stage, or live a short, privately funded life on the back of consulting income before being quietly shut down. This is a case study of one such a failure - TradesCloud. What went right? What went wrong? And what you can learn from TradesCloud’s mistakes if you’re contemplating starting a business of your own?

Ähnliche Filme

Loading...