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The Five Eyes secret European allies

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Amontons barracking on on the DP Director of an NGO in London called Privacy International in 1 year ago I was
here talking about the 5 eyes and I have they will formed where they uh began and we
ran through uh after world war 2 70 years ago this spying Alliance was created and far from being separate signals intelligence agencies spying agency of the UK gchq spying agency of the US the NSA Australia New Zealand and Canada have instead been acting as 1 as a single force intercepting all of our private communications and sharing them with each other by default they have shared bases in Oman and in Australia they get promoted so if you're gchq officer and you want to go and spend some time at NASA your lunchroom past gets you into the lunchroom at Fort Meade in the US such is their
level of integration and their offices as a result often get confused about who exactly they're working for spies the word for gchq an NSA have said the national product the communications that were intercepting is often indistinguishable they don't know what's come from gchq and what has come from the NSA the cooperation between the countries particularly in incident is so close that it becomes very difficult to know who is doing what it's just organizational mass now this is so important
because unless we understand how our intelligence agencies work internationally who they're cooperating with then we cannot hold them to account we cannot ensure that their actions of being properly regulated by law and that they're not playing games of jurisdictional arbitrage playing off each other's legal frameworks to reduce all of our rights to the lowest common denominator so the theme of this conference this year is finding Europe we talked about the Five Eyes we're not going to talk about the 9 eyes because of how I wish there were only 5 eyes
so this is basically all we know about an ionized uh it's the Five Eyes + France the Netherlands Denmark and Norway we don't know when they were formed we don't know what their purpose is the only reference we have to them is in the documents released by Edward Snowden the intelligence officers of spoken to say that most of the time this group is focused on Afghanistan and Russia but this massive
amounts of rule intelligence-sharing going on between them we don't have any public framework we don't have any acknowledgment in any treaty or in any of the parliament these are the kind of issues that we still haven't on pick the but the eyes not the big player in Europe and the 14 eyes are the big player in Europe but also known as
signals seniors Europe was against seniors Europe this is the 5 Eyes + France Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden Italy Spain Belgium and Germany now we know a tiny bit more and when I say a tiny bit I mean I'm gonna tell you everything I know and I can only tell you about 30 seconds because there were formed in 1982 uh and that's it the that's all we know we have reference found about them in every single document that I've uh and we have a small library at the NGO I work EPA's international which is just full of every single book about intelligence agencies their history autobiographies of
officers everything we we really no doubt about the stuff and there isn't a single reference only 1 has been found and it's here which says that there is a regional database system in Europe where the sick and organizations of NSA BND gchq dtsc in France Italian
eccentric cetera share data so again this is the existence of another signals intelligence sharing framework where they're sharing massive amounts of role private communications that each 1 of us and and we know almost nothing about them but the uh there's more of a 2nd seeing is Europe is the closest group of those tied to the 5 eyes but many many more intelligence agencies across Europe cooperates with the 5 eyes and here we've added Austria Czech Republic Croatia opponents and so all of a sudden you can see that most of
Europe is cooperating in some way with an essay in some way with gchq and this is a bigger problem than just Europe we have a similar thing here this was signal seen is Europe we also have signals in specific as well so how close to these relationships well it's important to say that when you enter into a third-party relationship and that's what these things are called this isn't a trivial exercise this is a a declassified document from the an internal NSA causally called the cryptologic courtly um and it talks about how i um obtaining material um and instigating these relationships is a very very significant task it requires staff coordination material hand and in some circumstances they choose not to
enter into relationships because the NSA is just not getting good value for money and it when you enter these things there's a big quid pro quo you really have to be exchanging something for something else right this isn't a one-way flow more
recently there was a document disclosed by the certainly gives a bit more information about
how the NSA thinks about these third-party relationships and they said here that they
form these when this against exchanges have increased in volume and complexity or you need rapid direct exchange of information the NSA says that in exchange for providing the 3rd party services BND or similar we provide them unique accesses with technical solutions and all access to related technology so here the ND has the geographical location the access to big undersea fiber-optic cables that coming in and out of the country and 1 a part of that gchq want a part of that and city provides them with the equipment that provide them with the software in exchange for them getting some of that information back an essay does it just for the information but also I and as they will go further it might be willing to share advanced techniques in return for that part is willingness to do something politically risky so
now Edward Snowden's told us about all of this and he when he was presenting to the
European Parliament he explains that it goes much deeper than this um he talked about something called a Foreign Affairs Directorate at the National Security Agency and it is hiding explain what it does 1 of the foremost activities of the Foreign Affairs Division is to pressure or incentivize EU Member States to change their laws To enable mass surveillance noise from the NSA as well as the UK gchq work very hard to search for loopholes in laws and constitutional protections that they can use to justify indiscriminate dragnet surveillance operations the In
recent public memory we've seen these legal guidance operations occur in Sweden and the Netherlands but so here an essay saying we want access to your tables we want access to the information you've got and your not spying on enough people so we're going to come on we're going to pressure you and encourage you to change your laws all workout legal loopholes that you can exploit to make yourself feel better the what you're doing is constitutionally in human rights compliance this is a map of the undersea
cables that flow in and out of the Europe and you can see just how many the 2nd partners that we've talked about have access to certain
said that when you start getting these new restrictions in place when went you change the law in these countries the next thing that NSA do when they successfully subverted or help for prio legal restrictions against unconstitutional mass surveillance it encourages them to perform access operations these are the operations to gain
access to bulk communications of all major telecommunications providers in the jurisdiction this is 1 of the programs that we learned about a school ramparts and this is doing exactly what Edward Snowden
has described here country X 1 of this against the New Europe partners has access to an undersea fiber-optic cable they topics the NSA 0 gchq has provided the technology for them to do that
and you can see here they then get a copy of it 1 is being processed domestically In 2011 the NS they spent 91 million on encouraging these kinds of operations in the partner countries this now 13 sites doing this kind of work around the world the locations were still unclear of the we
can begin to guess at what some of them are 1 of them is almost certainly Germany I just yesterday I we found out that day before yesterday we found that our new cooperation between the BND and gchq here very very clear terms it says that the British secret service gchq offered the BND advanced acquisition processing systems if Germany would tap into the transit data lines and exchange the raw data back we gchq this isn't just in Germany we've had
exactly the same thing in Denmark which is also thought to be another ramparts they country here In a secret document that was
released by Snowden it said that they wanted to remind the Danes of the long relationship looking at table accesses now in the Netherlands we have the
same thing now the Netherlands is an interesting legal so um circumstance because they can't do large bulk interception of cables the law
prohibits that's the only thing that they can do in bulk is something that comes from the sky from satellites to anything that isn't cable bands is OK but if it's through cable the Netherlands the Dutch and let's look at it now gchq not being very happy about this and so as part of their operations from an internal gchq document we found that the gchq said they have some legislative issues that they need to work through before the legal environment would allow them to operate in the way that gchq does we are providing legal advice on how we have tackled some of these issues to Dutch
lawyers now here is 1 of the questions that I find really interesting about intelligence sharing so the Dutch aren't allowed to tap undersea fiber-optic cables OK but gchq are so can the Dutch received in bulk
information that's come from a source the undersea cables but they're not allowed to get unfortunately yes the Oversight Committee looks at this and they said that it they're not going to look at the legality of where the information comes from despite the fact that they've admitted that they are receiving data in bulk from foreign partners the and this is the problem with intelligent showing it creates this race to the bottom where the lowest protections that are offered in a country the ones that are used and explained it's the same in Sweden the now Sweden's had a particularly close relationship with the NSA stretching back 50 years but the 5 eyes had a fight amongst themselves 8 years ago previously gchq was the lead agency with with the with Sweden and anything dealing with communications interception there's a gchq read NASA had the lead on electronica that interception and and they renegotiated this but what they had to promise each other and this is what this document says is that they needed to keep each other informed of what they were doing with the sum with the FRA um and they must always exchange all information that comes through and in 2011 the FRA
provided new access to the NSA on the undersea fibre-optic cable interception that's taking place this Sweden In Spain it's unclear just
how far the CNI the center financial intelligence is going but documents have told us the gchq are working with them on IP focused interception In France it's a similar story DGS there also according to the leaked documents gchq his says that they have they been very keen to provide presentations on their work which included sigh for detection in high-speed Barris high-speed barriers is spook lingo for undersea fiber-optic cables and so we have this system where the different states and now passing laws allowing themselves to do mass surveillance there being encouraged and help to do so by gchq and by NASA who are providing the that the legal framework and passing them on the back allowing them to feel good about what
they're doing but the state still feel that they need to protect their own citizens of course and so what happens is that this whole gets negotiated out Britain says Dennis OK we're gonna tap these cables you can have a copy but you can't look for bricks OK controverts Jimmy says the same thing to an essay OK will let you have 2 tables will give you a copy will take a copy as well be at NSA you comment the Germans same thing they say in Sweden the same thing they say in the Netherlands and of course that doesn't get us very far it means for 1 that my communication can still be intercepted by any of the other intelligence agencies in Europe who owe me no obligations whatsoever only gchq at the moment very in attempting to provide me with any obligations the and of course once that interception has taken place in all goes into the same pot that
1st negotiation is is useless anyway and Snowden told us about this he said the result of this is the European bizarre where EU member states like Denmark may give the NSA access to a tapping center on the unenforceable condition that NSA doesn't search at the Danes and Germany may give the NSA access to another on the condition it doesn't search for Germans yet the 2 tapping sensors might be on the 2 points but on exactly the same cable so an simply captures the communications of the German citizens when the going for Denmark and the Danish citizens as they go through Germany all the while know of none of the legal frameworks that they've system amongst themselves have been broken every state can compare their hands on the hard as say we're protecting you are citizens we've negotiated strongly against these big intelligence agencies don't you worry enabled us to feel very very proud of themselves and so this is all being justified under these very very broad legal frameworks um there's only 4 states that have really actively legislated for strategic surveillance although we can add France to this list and with the new order
came through yesterday all of them hints at the idea that what your spying on a foreigners we're looking outside our borders and as a result we don't owe them any protections and when you look through the
legislation that's what you find is of a single law in Europe that offers any protections when you intercepted communications for people not inside your jurisdiction the and when you receive
information or share information the laws treated the laws treated
in a very peculiar way many of these laws were created and drafted as 0 intelligence-sharing was me having a PDF document that I keep in them and then on open that I passed to you that's how they constructed a when you see the debates in some the countries when the laws have been passed that's what was thought of about intelligence-sharing that it was singular bits of refined information and that isn't what intelligence-sharing is now it isn't what happens between singing signals intelligence agencies it's billions of records being shared every single day amongst the states on laws are not taking this into account and not reflecting this and we're losing for it as a result so what
have we been doing well we've been trying to get access to these arrangements so we asked gchq fit a copy of them and we ask them for a copy of the 5
ization arrangement and we also ask them a copy of their canteen menu they said they couldn't provide us both a copy of the Five Eyes arrangement all they can see menu the national security so we filed with and so we thought the European Court
of Human Rights and demanding that they provide us with a copy of that can the menu and a copy of the Five Eyes arrangement that these things are so important because it's how the intelligence-sharing works that underpins how this whole system can be understood in how the loopholes exploits is that infringe all of our fundamental rights we see another we've took another case against CHQ and in the course of our litigation we force them to disclose for the 1st time I
and a description of how the intelligence-sharing work this is it this is
all we got if they had a secret hearing where just the tribunal and the government got to talk amongst themselves we went even told the date when this was taking part but we forced we managed to get a hold of this and what we found is that gchq were being very very clever as they are and how they
regional our politicians tell us are agencies don't intentionally circumvent the law well that's true so long as you have a very particular understanding of what's circumvention means and here we find out that they don't consider gchq intentionally circumventing the law when they couldn't technically get the information in any other way and so gchq would argue that it could not technically intersect all communications going in and out of the US so it's not a circumvention of the law for them to be able to receive all of that
information without a warrant this is how the justifying it this is how they get away with it the what they also tell the court is that when they share information between agencies therefore have strong internal safeguards underpinning how it all works that we did find out what they were the court wouldn't tell us but a few weeks later more documents were released and we got an a bit of a hint of what some of these things could be this is a document of dealing
with G CSB who read the New Zealand's intelligence agency and is talking about what happens when the US wants to get access to the raw intercepted data CSP have and they talk about the strong internal safeguards that are in place 1st analysis needs to log into a system called I learn it then needs to take select a PowerPoint presentation called New Zealand SID 7 it then reads the presentation and then they have to take a multiple choice open book test the if they feel that they've passed the test they then copy and paste the results into a word document the that it's that's the strong internal
safeguards that they have to ensure that the analyst in each country respecting the laws of the other stations as self-assessed open book test where you copy and paste the answers into words
documents this is the biggest spying aligned has ever been created and this is the legal system that is protecting us I couldn't believe it when I saw this I genuinely thought that they would do better how I was the so we sue gchq and we lost on a lot of points on each 1 of those points we lost we've appealed to the European Court of Human Rights but we 1 1 point they said that in the course of our suing gchq in they had to reveal this information but it was only because this information was revealed that it was that our legal but until this information was revealed it was legal so the court said that all
intelligence-sharing from NASA to gchq for the last 70 years was unlawful every bit of information the 112 billion text messages that are exchanged every single day the 98 million records from geo-location sheds gchq every single day completely unlawful and we're
making good use of this because it's been declared unlawful we think that you every single person in here has the right to find out whether you'll communications were part of
those unlawfully shared whether your fundamental rights were breached and so we set up a platform where you can enter in some details and we're going to assist you in completing forms that you consent to the Tribunal where they have an obligation to tell you if your communications were part of those unlawfully shed so
please please please if you haven't already done it got a Privacy international law all forward slash illegal spying and you can sign up to find out whether you'll communications were part of those illegally shed from an essay the gchq 1 of the other points that we lost to the tribunal was that we were trying to argue that gchq 0 you assuming well we all outside the UK and so now I've lost my rights gchq don't treat my communications with any additional safeguards to
every single 1 of us here we was saying should be treated equally as whether on is if you're in the UK the court didn't like that the in like
that but the reason that they gave for why they weren't finding in our favor is because the number of people that they need to get individual warrants for would be too large they say that they can't offer every single person here the same protections as those inside the UK because they're spying on too many people this is what the court found persuasive now we're talking about
all of this because our intelligence agencies
are that outpacing us they'll finding loopholes and they're staying 1 step ahead to stay 1 step ahead even more of our politicians when the he Hague on investigative journalist wrote his book about G. CSP he said that he got David longing here's the who was a New Zealand Prime Minister very well respected and in the of X using prime minister said it was until he read this book about the New Zealand intelligence agencies that he had any idea that New Zealand had been committed to an international integrated electonic spying network he didn't know he said it's an outrage the him and other ministers what told so little and raises the question of who they ultimately saw themselves answerable now document has said that NSA feeling quite comfortable with the situation that they're in this thing for a a variety of reasons or intelligence relationships are rarely disrupted by foreign political but tations international or dismissed domestic and they explained in this document that in many of the foreign partners capitals very few senior officials outside of the
intelligence apparatus even know about any signals intelligence connection to the US at all the new NSA commander has gone a bit further and he said clearly there some nations have been very vocal very visible in their frustration in their unhappiness but we have a level of capability and reach that few if any can replicate the value the NSA provides is almost irreplaceable they know that they're the big brother in the room they know that they're the 1 pushing for mass surveillance in all the states around the world forcing countries to weaken their domestic
protections and creating this system where we're in a global race to the bottom where people are trying to hold them accountable that putting pressure they saying no you can't find out this information and I say this is what we now need to do we need to expose these relationships we need to shine a light on how these organizations work together in our courts and in our Parliament so that we can bring our intelligence agencies once and for all under the rule of law thank you very much and
it in the internet uh inventory and be it and they're really enjoyed your talk and I like the work that you do and I have 1 question I mean it with all due respect but won't sound like that the sign events words only how can you believe that bullshit that you said about the law protecting us when it is so clear that
for the entire time without liberal democracies intelligence communities have crept up and circumvent the law isn't it the case that long along is simply
insufficient to prevent these people from doing these things if they cared at all about the fucking lost they wouldn't be stripping people of their citizenship endurance braking them as trees and made us with the gchq intelligence information so why do we want a legal solution and and how can the loss all this it hasn't solvers that's insanity to continue to try to use the law so what is the actual thing that we can actually do so I'm an optimist because high I agree the law doesn't solve the world's problems but I think it's a crucial part of it I think that it's 1 of the better ways that we can use to set 1 of values mean twice agencies and ultimately I feel that we need to convince the agencies to change we we need them to change their system and not want to key exploiting it now I don't think this is gonna happen by winning free legal cases it's going to take an entirely a huge shift in how we all think about it uh how governments work how we oversee agencies what their role should be in the 1st they should they even exist as we currently understanding in thinking of them were a long long way off that but without the law then I see us in a battle where they have a lot more power and I want technology to play a big role in that's and that's why everything we do is encrypted and everything that you do you should always cause always being credited as well but we need both and and that's why I see gchq that's why we fight in the courts and to use other tools and tools to help protect it every 1 of us is it has if you if you have any more questions
that he'll be around and the not invented
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Metadaten

Formale Metadaten

Titel The Five Eyes secret European allies
Serientitel re:publica 2015
Teil 52
Anzahl der Teile 177
Autor King, Eric
Lizenz CC-Namensnennung - Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen 3.0 Deutschland:
Sie dürfen das Werk bzw. den Inhalt zu jedem legalen Zweck nutzen, verändern und in unveränderter oder veränderter Form vervielfältigen, verbreiten und öffentlich zugänglich machen, sofern Sie den Namen des Autors/Rechteinhabers in der von ihm festgelegten Weise nennen und das Werk bzw. diesen Inhalt auch in veränderter Form nur unter den Bedingungen dieser Lizenz weitergeben.
DOI 10.5446/31940
Herausgeber re:publica
Erscheinungsjahr 2015
Sprache Englisch
Produktionsort Berlin

Inhaltliche Metadaten

Fachgebiet Informatik
Abstract Did you know there is an elite intelligence sharing club called SIGINT Seniors Europe working in partnership with the Five Eyes? For 35 years, the club has operated as a "European bazaar" for surveillance, playing games of jurisdictional arbitrage, exploiting secret loopholes in domestic legal frameworks to swap and share data on each others citizens. For the first time we have the information to act, and we must!

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