Good afternoon.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice President, Mr. Dombrowski. Based on our regular economic and monetary

analysis, we have conducted a thorough assessment of the economic and inflation outlook, also taking into account the latest staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. As a result, the Governing Council took the

following decisions in the pursuit of its price stability objective. First, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We now expect them to remain at their present levels at least through the end of 2019.

And in any case, for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below but close to 2 percent over the medium term. Second, we intend to continue reinvesting in

full the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the asset purchase program for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ECB interest rates. And in any case, for as long as necessary to

maintain favorable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. Third, we decided to launch a new series of quarterly targeted longer term refinancing operations, Teltra 3, starting in September

this year and ending in March 2021, each with a maturity of two years. These new operations will help to preserve favorable bank lending conditions and the smooth transmission of monetary policy.

Under Teltra 3, counterparties will be entitled to borrow up to 30 percent of the stock of eligible loans as at 28 February 2019 at the rate indexed to the interest rate on the

main refinancing operations over the life of each operation. Like the outstanding Teltra program, Teltra 3 will feature built in incentives for credit conditions to remain favorable.

Further details on the precise terms of Teltra 3 will be communicated in due course. Fourth, we will continue conducting our lending operations as fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment for as long as necessary, and at least until the end of the reserve maintenance

period starting in March 2021. Today, monetary policy decisions were taken to ensure that inflation remains on a sustained path towards levels that are below but close to 2

percent over the medium term. While there are signs that some of the idiosyncratic domestic factors dampening growth are starting to fade, the weakening in economic data points to a sizable moderation in the pace of the economic expansion that will extend into the

current year. The persistence of uncertainties related to geopolitical factors, the threat of protectionism and vulnerabilities in emerging markets appears to be leaving marks on economic sentiment.

Moreover, underlying inflation continues to be muted. The weaker economic momentum is slowing the adjustment of inflation towards our aim. At the same time, supportive financing conditions, favorable labor market dynamics, and

rising wage growth continue to underpin the Euro area expansion and gradually rise in inflation pressures. Today's decisions will support the further build up of domestic price pressures and headline

inflation developments over the medium term. Significant monetary policy stimulus will continue to be provided by our foreign guidance on the key ECB interest rates, reinforced by the reinvestments of the sizable stock of acquired assets and the new series of Tetros.

In any event, the Governing Council stands ready to adjust all of its instruments as appropriate to ensure that inflation continues to move towards the Governing Council's inflation aim in a sustained manner. Let me now explain our assessment in greater

detail, starting with economic analysis. Euro area real GDP increased by 0.2 percent quarter on quarter in the fourth quarter of 2018, following growth of 0.1 in the third quarter.

Incoming data have continued to be weak, in particular in the manufacturing sector, reflecting the slowdown in external demand compounded by some country and sector specific factors. The impact of these factors is turning out to

be somewhat longer lasting, which suggests that the near term growth outlook would be weaker than previously anticipated. Looking ahead, the effect of these adverse factors is expected to unwind. The Euro area expansion will continue to be

supported by favorable financing conditions, further employment gains and rising wages, and the ongoing orbit, somewhat slower expansion in global activity. This assessment is broadly reflected in the March

2019 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the Euro area. These projections foresee annual rate GDP increasing by 1.1 percent in 2019, 1.6 percent in 2020, 1.5 percent in 2021.

Compared with the December 2018 Euro system staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for real GDP growth has been revised down substantially in 2019 and slightly in 2020.

The risks surrounding the Euro era growth outlook are still tilted to the downside on account of the persistence of uncertainties related to

geopolitical factors. The threat of protectionism and vulnerabilities in the emerging markets. According to Eurostat's flash estimate, Euro area annual HICP inflation was 1.5 percent in February 2019 after 1.4 in January, reflecting

somewhat higher energy and food price inflation. On the basis of futures, of current futures prices for oil, headline inflation is likely to remain around the current levels before declining towards the end of the year.

Measures of underlying inflation remain generally muted, but labor cost pressures have strengthened and broadened amid high levels of capacity utilization and tightening labor markets. Looking ahead, underlying inflation is

expected to increase over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the ongoing economic expansion and rise in wage growth. This assessment is also broadly reflected in the

March 2019 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the Euro area, which foresee annual HICP inflation at 1.2 percent in 2019, 1.5 in 2020, and 1.6 in 2021. Compared with the December 2018 Eurosystem staff

macroeconomic projections, the outlook for HICP inflation has been revised down across the projection horizon, reflecting in particular the more subdued near-term growth outlook. Turning to the monetary analysis, broad money and

M3 growth decreased to 3.8 percent in January 2019 from 4.1 percent in December 2018. M3 growth continues to be backed by bank credit creation, notwithstanding a recent moderation in

credit dynamics. The narrow monetary aggregate M1 remained the main contributor to broad money growth. The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations declined to 3.3 percent in January

from 3.9 percent in December last year, reflecting a base effect, but also in some countries, the typical lagged reaction to the slowdown in economic activity while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained at 3.2

percent. Borrowing conditions for firms and households still favorable, as the monetary policy measures put in place since June 2014 continue to support access to financing, particular for small and medium-sized enterprises.

The policy measures decided today, and in particular, the new series of TELTROs will help to ensure that bank lending conditions remain favorable going forward. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of economic analysis with the signals coming from

the monetary analysis confirmed that an ample degree of monetary accommodation is still necessary for the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below but close to 2 percent over the medium term. In order to reap the full benefits from our

monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute more decisively to raising the longer-term growth potential and reducing vulnerabilities. The implementation of structural reforms in euro-area countries needs to be substantially

stepped up to increase resilience, reduce structural unemployment, and boost euro-area productivity and growth potential. This is particularly important in view of the overall limited implementation of the 2018 country-specific recommendations as recently

communicated by the European Commission. Regarding fiscal policies, the mildly expansionary euro-area fiscal stance and the operation of automatic stabilizers are providing support to economic activity.

At the same time, countries where government debt is high need to continue rebuilding fiscal buffers. All countries should continue to increase efforts to achieve a more growth-friendly composition of public finances. Likewise, the transparent and consistent

implementation of the European Union's fiscal and economic governance framework over time and across countries remains essential to bolster the resilience of the euro-area economy. Improving the functioning of economic and monetary union remains a priority.

The Governing Council welcomes the ongoing work and urges further specific and decisive steps to complete the banking union and the capital markets union. And we are now at your disposal for questions. Ms. Lok.

Carolyn Lok, Bloomberg. Mr. President, could you give us an idea about the reasons why you decided on the specific features of the Tell-To-Three program? So, for example, why are the maturities two years? Why have you indexed it to the MRO? And also, why is the start date in September

when the funding becomes relevant for banks' net stable funding ratios in June already? And my second question is what you would like to achieve with this program? So, are you trying to keep the size of the balance sheet stable, or are you trying to add extra accommodation? Thank you.

Thank you. The design of the Tell-To responds to a variety of objectives, but the key one is the key objective derives from how the situation of bank funding looks like over the next few years.

In the coming years, we will have a congestion for bank funding caused by, obviously, some the coming to maturity of the existing Tetras. The coming to maturity of a sizable amount of bank

bonds, various regulatory compliances. And so, the Tetras, as it's been said in the introductory statement, maintain favorable, preserve favorable bank lending conditions and the smooth transmission of monetary policy. Now, the precise design, whether it's two instead

of four, do reflect the changed conditions we have today. Now, further details, especially on the pricing and other details, will get to be known in due time. Now, on the second question really addresses

the substance of today's meeting. So, let me give you a kind of a broad account of how this meeting unfolded, and in so doing, I think I'm pretty sure I respond to some of the questions you intend to ask.

So, first of all, the decisions. It's four sets of decisions. We expect, so we moved the calendar-based part of our forward guidance from September to December.

The second, we confirmed the reinvestment in full of the principle payments from mature in securities. Now, you understand now the importance of the chain, of the chain element in our monetary policy. Having moved the calendar-based, so does the expected, whatever the horizon is going to

be, during which the purchase will take place to keep the stock unchanged. So, you see this added accommodation. So, to answer your question, as a matter of fact, you asked me whether this is adding

accommodation. The financing conditions have been, well, monetary policy has been very accommodative, but also financing conditions, as a matter of fact, have even eased since our last meeting, and this is also partly due to the structure of our forward guidance so that expected interest

rates have gone down since the last meeting, and especially at the end of last year as well. So, then we have the third element is the target longer-term refinancing operations that we've just discussed, and then we have the fixed-rate tender procedures with full

allotments for as long as necessary, at least until the end of the reserve maintenance period starting in March 2021. Now, what are the features of all these measures? First of all, they are data-driven. These are decisions that have been taken

following a significant downward revision of the forecast by our staff. Second, you've seen and you just heard me say that optionality is reiterated in all instances, which means that the Government Council is both willing and committed to act when, if

needed, amplifying the use of these instruments based on the data. And third, is what I just said, is all this takes place in an environment where monetary policy accommodation is already very substantial.

Second point is how did we get to take these decisions? And the answer here is that they were unanimous. It was unanimity. And I think, given the complexity of the package,

I think it's a very, very positive sign for the cohesiveness of the Government Council and of our deliberations. Third, what is the general context in which these decisions have taken place? Well, we're coming, and maybe we still are, in a

period of continued weakness and pervasive uncertainty. And that's why the forecast has been revised downward quite significantly. Now, I will come and comment a moment about the

pervasive uncertainty, but the factors that have originally caused this weakness, which are mostly of external source, are still there. And so the uncertainty is partly related to how long these factors will continue affecting the

world economy, the eurozone economy and confidence more generally. And there are two observations to make about the assessment of the outlook. First, the Government Council expressed

confidence. All members expressed confidence in the baseline, which means that we assess the probabilities of a recession as being very low, as well as the probabilities of a recession, and the anchoring of inflation expectations are indeed very low in our

assessment. What are the reasons? Well, the reasons are the same that underpin the strength of our economy in our previous meetings, namely nominal wage growth continues to continue the labour market, though it is kind of slower rate but continues to improve,

consumption remains by and large in good shape, monetary policy remains accommodative and now is even more accommodative, and financing conditions, as I said, have eased up, they were already very easy and they eased up further.

And there is a second factor that we've taken into account in maintaining this confidence is that it's true that these external factors continue to be hanging on, continue to be waning on the Eurozone economy, but it's also true that governments are responding in their

respective jurisdictions with policies that are addressing these problems in U.S., in China. The second point to be kept in mind is that you've seen that the revision of the inflation path basically says one thing, we have confidence

that we'll converge, but we also at this point in time think that it's going to take longer to get there. So, and why is it going to take longer? Well, the weaker growth probably will further slow

down the pass through from higher nominal wages to higher price, higher inflation and possibly also slow down the closure of the, will also slow down the output gap.

In other words, the output gap now is closing. So these two reasons are important to be kept in mind. Now, the other important part of today's decision is that we maintained the risk assessment as tilted to the downside.

This is infrequent because we usually say when we take some policy actions, the risks get back into balance. But it's happened on other occasions in the past, but not frequently. And why is that? Well, because we are aware that our decisions certainly increase the resilience of this Eurozone

economy, but can actually they, can they address these factors that are weighing on the Eurozone economy in the rest of the world? They cannot. So the threat of protection is one factor. Geopolitical considerations also related to the, to

whatever happens about the United Kingdom, Brexit or United Kingdom exiting or not exiting or in the forms in which they will exit from the European Union. So the emerging market vulnerabilities, what's

happening in China, we know that the Chinese government has reacted, the US government has, the US monetary policy has changed. But for example, in US, we have to take into account that there is going to be a waning effect of the fiscal package. So as low down is projected there all over. So basically our actions increase the resilience

of the Eurozone economy. And, and so make us confident, keep us confident that convergence to sustainable rate of inflation, our objective will happen. Thank you. Ms. Weisbach.

Annette Weisbach, CNBC. Can I ask you about what you said a little bit earlier, that you're standing ready to adjust all of your instruments available. Does that also include the net asset purchase programme? Could you revive it in case the economy is not

going any way better and the inflation outlook is going to worsen? And then I have a question on the underlying assumption of your growth and inflation estimates. Is the underlying assumption that US and China will come to an agreement on trade or not? Thank you.

The answer to the second question is that our projections take into account the protections measures that have already been implemented. But they don't project an assessment of future measures or of how the current negotiation

will actually end. On the first question is, well you've seen optionality is everywhere. Now the issue is whether we see contingencies that would justify the use of certain instruments instead of others. And I don't want to speculate at this point in time.

At this point in time, we've just taken all these decisions and we think they are the right decisions and the adequate decisions to be taken at this point in time. But let me add one thing, we didn't tighten when we stopped purchasing the net asset, when we stopped the net asset purchase program.

We didn't tighten monetary policy, contrary to what some of you say. I'm not sure it's one of you, but it's been said. We didn't tighten at all. We continue, just to give you an idea,

the balance sheet of the ECB is about 40 to 43% of the Eurozone GDP. The Fed is about half of it now. And in order to keep this stock unchanged, we continue purchasing something,

the order of 20 billion euro a month of bonds. And this happens in a context where the debt to GDP ratio in the Eurozone is actually falling. So the simple action of maintaining a stock unchanged

in this context actually is it continues easing because interest rates are pushed downward by this action. So, and you can see this because since we decided June last year, interest rates have gone down, they keep on going down, 10 premium is negative.

So conditions are very, very accommodative. And if you add to this what I just said, it's the chained element of this, of the horizon over which we'll carry out purchases to keep the stock unchanged moves together with the forward guidance.

But to finish the answer, what today's decisions also say is that we've taken, we changed the calendar base, the part of our forward guidance based on the information we have today. And it's data driven. In this sense, we are very open to act

and determine to act when it's needed. Ms. Jones. Claire Jones, Financial Times. Ahead of the meeting, there was some talk from some of the members of the Governing Council about whether or not to introduce a tiered system,

whether to start by raising the deposit rate. So I'm just wondering, was there any trade off in terms of extending the guidance to the end of this year rather than say further into 2020 in order to not have to make any commitment to move to some sort of tiered system

and in order to have the unanimity behind the decisions that you've had today? And having said that, even though the guidance on rates isn't as extended as far as markets are now foreseeing for the first rate rise, there is a broad sense in which you've got ahead of the curve today

and that you have really surprised people by not only announcing something on TelTros but also announcing that you've shifted your message on forward guidance. So can you maybe explain a little bit about the reaction function here, why you've decided to deploy these shock and awe tactics? Was there something in particular that has scared you

that you've seen in the recent data? Thank you. Thank you. Several members of the Governing Council presented the option of changing the calendar date of the forward guidance to March next year.

In a way, that was an option. And the other members discussed what the consequence of a protracted period of time

with negative rates, so lower or low for longer could imply for banks. But there was no trade-off between the two. There was no trade-off. And in the end, we converged on a package that basically reflected the views

of all the members of the Governing Council. And I think that's what I... Now, the second part of your question is whether... Well, markets have pretty well understood our reaction function. And so in placing the expected date of the lift,

the DFR sometime in 2019, before it was later, now it's moved back. And so the changing calendar, in the calendar part, in the date of our forward guidance becomes necessary

when you kind of want to give credibility. Because clearly, if you have expectations, market expectations, which are far away from the foreseen date of the guidance, then of course, credibility becomes an issue.

In this sense, I think we've, if anything, enhanced the credibility of the forward guidance with today's decision. Thank you. Mr. Khourani. Thank you, Balazs Khourani from Reuters. In your statement, you said there will be

some incentives built into the Telchows. I'd like to find out a bit more about this, what kind of incentives, and is the MRO the lowest rate banks could pay, or do the incentives take it lower, possibly? The second question is about the Supervisory Board. And I'm curious why you left three positions vacant.

A fourth one is gonna be vacant very soon. Why are you not picking people to the Supervisory Board? What's the benefit of depleting the Supervisory Board? Thank you. The first question is really, I can't say more than I said in the introductory statement.

The price in the shape and other details on the Teltro will be made known in due time. So, what I just said about whatever incentives and language you just quoted, it's the intention of designing in a way

that gives built-in incentives for credit conditions to remain favorable, but doesn't get further into being more specific at this point in time. On the Supervisory Board, yes, well, it is a process

which will be carried out in a completely transparent way in the coming weeks, and it's with a change in the chair and so on, so everything's been delayed. But we'll take time soon. It'll take place soon. Mr. Malin?

Jan Malin, Handelspad. I have one question on the timing. Yeah, markets were quite surprised about your decisions today. Why did you decide to act now? Because many people have argued before the meeting that there's such a high uncertainty

and that it would be maybe better to wait to see if this uncertainty is materialized or not. And my second question is on your forward guidance. You kept the state contingent part and the time contingent part.

Why have you kept the time contingent part? Because you also said it could be pushed further ahead, and would it not give you more flexibility to just have the state contingent part?

Thank you. Thank you. The presence of, well, the two things were present. Pervasive uncertainty, but also a definite worsening in the projections.

So the fact that the climate's become more uncertain doesn't mean that one has to stay put. So you just do what you think is right. You temper, however, what you're doing with the consideration there is uncertainty. So in other words, in a dark room,

you move with tiny steps. You don't run, but you do move. Or say, in other words, you try to be proactive rather than reactive to contingencies. Because for a variety of reasons, the situation can then unfold

in an unforeseen and unwanted way. So that's the answer to the first question. The second question, the two, the ARF forward guidance has been designed with two legs, the state and the time. And both of them reinforce each other.

And both of them give credibility to each other. To have a state only is kind of, as you said, perhaps gives more flexibility, but at the same time, being vaguer is less effective. Thank you. Mr. Stouff?

Hi, I'm Joseph Stouff from Espanción. Could you elaborate a bit more in the chosen of the TLTRO with T instead of an LTRO? What have been the reasons for this? And just one question more.

Do you want to make any comment on the statement of the ECB that has confirmed that you're gonna end your mandate without hiking the interest rates? No, I make no comments. First of all, it's not me, it's the Governing Council.

But I have no comments to make. Now, the other point is actually, it's been discussed. The first LTROs were quite effective for the time when they had been designed. But they were used, not 100%, of course,

but they were used also to kind of buy sovereign bonds. At that time, the yields on bonds were high and banks, especially in parts of the Eurozone, were to lend to the economy was very risky because these parts were in huge recession.

They bought sovereign bonds. What then we wanted to achieve with the T was to make sure, to minimize this possibility, to make sure the banks borrow at a very good rate, but in order to lend to the economy

and to firms and households and the private sector, not to buy sovereign bonds. Miss Bufaki? Isabella Bufaki from Soleventi Quattrore. I have two questions, Mr. President.

One is on markets that have been surprised and actually, we, I think, have also been surprised by these moves, four bold moves on an accommodation that was already very ample. Is your message not only to the markets, but also to European governments?

Is Europe, do you view, reacting as you are reacting in a bold manner to the deterioration of the economy? And I know there is a lot on the plate, so I don't want to go too far on the toolbox of others, but I've seen that Philip Lane now is confirmed

as new executive board member and he's also linked to a project of safe assets. And do you feel that the ECB has enough in its toolbox? Do you feel that Europe has enough in its toolbox,

as well? Thank you. Well, thank you. I think, well, let me first respond to the first part. It's easy for us to plea for more action

at European level in all directions, institutional policies and so on. I think we should do it, but we should be aware that these are political decisions that governments can take or have to take,

but they have to explain to their citizens. It's relatively easy to advise about the right policy. Much more difficult is to implement it in a democratic society, of course.

So I think, sadly, I've said many times, the European construction is still fragile. The completion of the monetary union is essential. The completion of the banking union is essential. Capital market union are all essential things. And by the way, some of these things are very,

very close to be implemented because much of this has been agreed and the remaining differences don't seem to be of an order of magnitude that could stop the whole process. So when the, I'll say, when the political contingencies, when the political stars will align,

I'm absolutely confident we'll see fast progress on all these fronts. Now, Phillip Lane is an excellent acquisition for the ECB, but we are not gonna ask him about the safe, this Euro bond thing.

The Euro bond is, again, it's not something that the ECB can force or just decide about. Again, it's an inherently political decision. And of course, this doesn't detract at all from the argument that it's absolutely rational

to have a safe asset at European level. It's fundamental. But one thing is to say it's fundamental. Another thing is to decide and defend this decision in front of your citizens, which may have different views about that from the ECB.

Visage. Michelle Rachnoin, Zuercher Zeitung. Two questions, if I may. The Teltros are also a kind of subsidies for banks, especially for weak banks. A lot of these banks are paying dividends to their shareholders and bonuses to their senior managers.

Do you think this fits together with the subsidies? And my second question, some economists are thinking the ECB policy was behind the curve in the last quarters, meaning monetary policy was not fully in line with the economic cycle. Do you understand these critics or do you think the critic is unfair?

Well, on your first question, a Teltro is an operation which gives, which allows banks to borrow money from the ECB at somewhat more favorable terms

than the banks could do going to the market. And that's the essence. And so the issue is not whether there is a subsidy or not. There is a subsidy. Now, it depends very much on how it's designed, of course. If there were no subsidies, then nobody would take up the Teltros.

So the issue is whether the Teltro fulfills monetary policy objectives and helps the transmission of monetary policy. And we believe it's always done that. It's been very effective, as a matter of fact, in reactivating the banking sector in the eurozone

and in transmitting, especially the Teltro, transmitting the better lending conditions to firms and households, to the private sector in the economy. I think that's the yardstick of successful Teltro.

And certainly I have all reasons to think that this will be designed exactly in the same, with the same effectiveness. Your other question was? Oh, or behind. Well, we never thought we were behind the curve.

I think we've been, well, in any event today, we are not behind the curve for sure. But this, even before, because the way the monetary policy had been designed, the monetary policy has been designed after June would produce automatic accommodation

that would make financing conditions easier as far as the monetary policy component is concerned. Then of course, when, since I said, and it was like that before too, I mean, just since we are,

in our deliberations, data-driven, when it's become necessary to add to this automatic process, we did it. Mr. Fairless? Mr. Draghi, my first question was on QE

and whether, was there any discussion this week about restarting the program? Would that be the next tool, the next stimulus tool you could use in the event of a downturn around no-deal Brexit, for instance? And the second question is, given the length of the Eurozone recovery so far,

is there a risk that the economy is becoming too dependent on ECB stimulus? Thanks. Well, the answer is no to both questions, actually. There was no discussion about QE, not at all. And there was no,

there's no lack of recovery in the Eurozone economy. We, I have dwelt long enough on the worsening of the economic outlook, but we're still talking about weaker growth. So we're talking about expansion. The economy continues to expand.

The labor market continues to add jobs. Weight nominal wages continue to grow, as a matter of fact, at a higher rate than they used to a year ago or two years ago. Even, interesting, the dispersion amongst growth rates of nominal wages across sectors and countries

is now at a historical minimum, meaning that it's gradually, yes, the point is that we've got to be patient in terms of pass-through. We see nominal wages going up and we don't see prices going up at the same time. And we have to be patient because, first of all,

now we are having a slowdown, but also because the mechanism whereby increasing the cost wages, and also other parts of the cost components are transferred into prices, has changed structurally in the last few years.

And you've seen this in the United States and you're seeing this in Europe now. Sir, I think. Luke Hyton, Market News. Mr. Draghi, given that the 2021 inflation forecast is already only 1.6%, if any external shocks were to materialize,

can you envisage a situation in which the deposit rate could be lowered even further? And was there any discussion of this at today's meeting? And my second question was, it's been argued that high current account surpluses have a detrimental effect on inflation across the Eurozone. Might one answer to disappointing inflation rates be to adopt a tougher stance towards those countries whose surpluses exceed,

to, sorry, might one answer to disappointing inflation rates be to adopt a tougher stance towards those countries whose surpluses exceed 6% of GDP? Thank you. First question, no, there was no discussion. The second question is,

you find a hint in introductory statement about how a proper fiscal policy could actually help not only the recovery, not only the convergence of inflation to our path,

objective path, but also on the issue of external surplus. When you read the last section of our introductory statement, which says, well, it says that basically,

the implementation of the country-specific recommendations as recently communicated by the European Commission has been scant or not much at best. And then it says, it's a change with respect to previous IES. Regarding fiscal policies, the mildly expansionary Euro-era fiscal stance

and the operational automatic stabilizers are providing support to economic activity. And then it goes into the same usual statement for countries with high debt. So you see that there's a clear recognition that of what you said, but again, to this, I would apply

the same degree of humility that I would apply in answering to the question about Europe and whether Europe is responding or not, are political decisions. And even though we may be convinced that it's right,

we also have to be aware that we are not the ones who implement these decisions. Mr. Schreus? Thank you, Mark Schreus, Berzenseidung. My first question is also on the deficit facility rate.

You mentioned that there was a discussion about the potential risk to banks if following this low for longer interest rate policy. I'm not sure, have you also discussed ways to mitigate the adverse effects or discussed when there might be a point in time when you have to decide on such things? And the second question,

you mentioned several times, optionality is everywhere and that the toolbox is rich. Is also helicopter money part of the toolbox, especially given the fact that you've called it once an interesting concept? Thank you. Yeah. Well, there was a concession to my past academic experience but no, the answer is no to both questions.

And the effect that negative rates might have on bank's balance sheets is complex and was not the specific mitigating measures were not discussed.

Excuse me. We, I mean, there was a discussion about the need to examine this issue in debt. Because, you know, I mean, negative rates have been quite successful in our monetary policy. They produced, they were an instrument,

powerful instrument in enhancing fostering the recovery and converging to price stability and achieving our objective. So when there are several analysis trying to assess what's the effect of negative rates for some time

on banks profitability, but they're very, very complicated. First of all, we're talking about aggregates. Now the way in which negative rate affects the bank's profitability depends very much on what business model the bank has. And so you have situations where this influence is very, very important and significant

and situations where it's not. And if you combine the aggregate, you don't see much in spite of the many years that passed by. So it's been successful. So second point. One may argue that certainly at the beginning,

combined with the QE, there were benefits coming from the recovery, coming from the selling of the bonds with the QE, and there were costs coming from the negative rates. Now how all this has evolved through time is quite complicated. Also, again, talking about the aggregate,

but that's why I'm not satisfied with looking at aggregates so much, but that's what we have to do. You see that when you talk about profitability of European banks, well, it's certainly lower than profitability of American banks, but not much lower than UK or Japan,

whether they have mitigating measures or not. And so because there are many elements that affect the profitability, so we have to look at this issue in somewhat greater detail, and not necessarily related to the negative rates,

but more generally, what are the components of banks' profitability that are being affected by our monetary policy, and one which is the negative rate? Mr. Barbera.

Thank you, my question is how much of the 2019 GDP slowdown is due by the Italian economic situation, and why? Thank you, thank you, because I didn't comment exactly on the factors for the slowdown of 2019.

There are two sets of factors, external and internal to the eurozone. The external factors are, I hinted at them before, it's mostly slowdown in world trade. Due to a slowdown in China,

various emerging market vulnerabilities, potential slowdown in the United States, and I think a general sort of lower confidence produced by the trade discussions,

let's call them this way. And this certainly, this sort of diminished confidence filtered through countries and sectors, and it's one major factor for the slowdown in the eurozone economy. Then we have internal factors.

Some of them are sector-specific and country-specific, namely car industry in Germany. But there are also other sectors and other countries, one of which is certainly Italy. So we know what has produced the slowdown.

Where the uncertainty comes into play is how long these factors will be sort of hovering, will be weighing on the eurozone economy. That's it. And the final question to Ms. Léart, please.

Thank you, two questions, if I may, Mr. Draghi. The first is a follow-on question to the gentleman to my left. Are there any other regions or industries that you think are particularly vulnerable that you may be keeping an eye on? The second question is, do you have any concern that equity markets are a little bit more concerned

about a recession than you may be? And I say that because I'm looking at the equities that are doing well. They're very defensive stocks, cyclical stocks. So do you have any concerns that the markets are more bearish than you may be? Well, I'm not sure that equity markets are more bearish because they actually regained everything they lost

in the last part of the year, last year. They gained it back and plus. So, but we have to see what are the sources of this increase in stock prices. In some parts of the world, this is caused mostly by earnings expectations that are good.

In other parts of the world, this is caused by a decrease in risk premium. And earning expectations actually appear to have less of an influence in explaining price increases. So I think that says something about the expectations

about the economy, the future evolution of the economy. Mind, there is another factor which actually has played quite an important role, especially at the beginning of this year, and that's the discount factor. Namely, if people have a lower discount factor,

they tend to have higher valuations for the stocks and therefore that's the element that's mostly affected by monetary policy or expectations about the discount factor. Thank you. Thanks. Thanks.