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A Decade After Stuxnet's Printer Vulnerability

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A Decade After Stuxnet's Printer Vulnerability
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Printing is still the Stairway to Heaven
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374
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CC Attribution 3.0 Unported:
You are free to use, adapt and copy, distribute and transmit the work or content in adapted or unchanged form for any legal purpose as long as the work is attributed to the author in the manner specified by the author or licensor.
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Abstract
In 2010, Stuxnet, the most powerful malware in the world revealed itself, causing physical damage to Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. In order to reach Iran's centrifuges, it exploited a vuln in the Windows Print Spooler service and gain code execution as SYSTEM. Due to the hype around this critical vuln, we (and probably everyone else) were pretty sure that this attack surface would no longer exist a decade later. We were wrong… The first clue was that 2 out of 3 vulns which were involved in Stuxnet were not fully patched. That was the case also for the 3rd vuln used in Stuxnet, which we were able to exploit again in a different manner. It appears that Microsoft has barely changed the code of the Print Spooler mechanism over the last 20 years. We investigated the Print Spooler mechanism of Windows 10 Insider and found two 0-day vulns providing LPE and DoS (First one can also be used as a new persistence technique)