He gave us these dire predictions of what's going to happen if we keep on living happily as we do. The others are Cooper and Schrieffer, particularly Cooper, went off in an entirely different field,

hoping to get a new Nobel Prize, perhaps in neurology and subjects of that sort. And so on with others. I wish him well. So on with others.

Now, I have an excuse for going through the subject, and it might interest you to permit me to make some personal remarks. When I was a boy, during the time of the First World War, I was intensely pro-German because of the great eminence of the Germans in science.

By the time of the Second World War, I was just as much anti-German because of the suppression of science, amongst other things. And then when war came, indeed well before the war came,

I was very eager to do something about the problem. And well before the United States entered the war officially, a number of colleagues got together and we started a war laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts,

devoted to radar, which was then a very serious problem, particularly for the British. I'm talking about 1940. Well, we were still not at war, but we were able to get a certain amount of money from the government

to develop certain elements in microwave radar. And by the end of the year, that's to say by the end of 1941, I felt I had put in enough time and was going to go back to Columbia.

I'd interrupted my career. At the time, things were going very well. When arriving in Boston from New York, I saw the headline that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. That put all such thoughts aside and it was clear we were in the war.

And in the war very heavily. I feel that when a scientist changes from science to the practical application of science, whether it's war, everything else, anything else, he has to change completely and move in the most efficient direction for achieving the objective.

In this case, the movement had to be of two kinds. One in the direct working on specific things. Secondly, to keep in mind the idea that you're there to win the war. Which meant that the instruments of warfare which you had to develop

had to suit the purpose of winning the war. Not what the military people told you, who are mostly quite ignorant of the higher developments of technology. So you had to enter into the thinking of being at war or whatever you're doing.

And secondly, you have to learn to know those people to whom you are trying to convince to use your particular products. You can call it salesmanship, whatever it is. Which means you had to think about war in a military kind of way. What is the correct direction?

Where will the war go? They can't tell you. You had to outguess them what to develop. So as you see in this way, there'd be a conversion. I don't mean everybody has to do it, but at that time I was already an elder statesman and was part of my job to help direct this laboratory in the direction

which would go for the purpose of winning the war. To do this, you had to first find out what the possible policy would be. You'd have to make an anticipation of what the events of the war would be. And you'd have to find ways and means of persuading people

who are not accustomed to be talked to in this way by civilians that you mean well and you're friends and that you appreciate their abilities and you want them to appreciate your abilities. This was the main job there. And on the whole, it was very satisfactory.

We developed very close relations with the military. We understood after a time that they were very often, very sincere people trying to do their job. They had their limitations. But there were things that they could do, we couldn't do, and vice versa, by learning to understand them,

by being together with them, drinking with them, all that sort of thing, you finished that you could work harmoniously. My relations through this radar development and also to some degree through the atomic bomb project gave me many connections with different levels in the government,

the military, and certain other kind. Well, this went on for five years. In five years, one becomes a changed man. The person out of the laboratory and engaged in these broader problems for five years

is no longer the man he was at the beginning. The most important thing that happened to me, however, was to be present at the first test of the atomic bomb at Alamogordo. I won't describe the thing to you.

Many poetic descriptions have been given by those who were present. But at the end of that morning where the test took place, I realized that people who had seen this, who had felt this, to realize what it meant for the continuation of civilization,

for the continuation of science, for the continuation of things which we held most dear, family, offspring, country, civilization, the race, that you had to testify and do what you could to bring this under control in some form.

Furthermore, one realized very quickly as soon as I entered this war work that human beings are very frail and the power of science is such that human beings,

the whole human race, lay at the mercy of the human race. The developments for killing people, for destroying the artifacts of civilization could grow immeasurably and perhaps was most fortunate that in the past there was no close relation between the scientists and the military.

Perhaps we would not be here to give a talk on this subject. In any event, by the end of the war, this recognition of the power of science was deeply in the mind and spirit of the people in the government,

particularly the military. And most of my friends in the military had a feeling the sort which I described was a period right after the war when although in a certain sense flushed with victory, there was a great sadness because of the new thing which had come into the world.

And therefore, feeling this, I could not escape, nor did I want to escape, some kind of official semi-political involvement. And this concerned various things like setting up of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, which I became a member of the General Advisory Committee.

Oppenheimer was chairman. Enrico Fermi was a member of this commission. Other names which would be well known to all of you. And the development there was to be along lines of peaceful development but also the development of bigger and better

and more efficient atomic weapons. With my feeling that the way to influence general policy in government was to be inside. In the first place, there you could know with exactness

what was going on. There you could know where policy was being made, who was making it, what the forces were. And by contributing to the thing, you had a certain standing. And we had many very important struggles

and some of it has become public, like the very great struggle with this General Advisory Committee on the one side and the group around Edward Teller on the other side about the development of the thermonuclear bomb, things of that sort.

But my own objective in being in this was in the direction of doing what one can to perhaps remove this from the arsenal of the world and to use the positive side, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, to bring a greater cooperative effort

and understanding between the nations since they could no longer exist indefinitely with a buildup of atomic stockpiles. I had various positions of this sort within the government and my direction was always in this direction to utilize science and the products of science

to make connections between countries. I'm not going to suggest that science can do a very great deal to bring peace. We're in the hands of politicians in the first place. We have two problems, one to the education of the politician

and secondly of what is actually happening to make him feel not just information but to have him feel this viscerally. And the other problem is to persuade him that the direction of development is not in becoming stronger and stronger

but in trying to come to some accommodation. And in this way, a group of my friends were able to persuade the United States government by 1946 to put out a plan for containing atomic weapons

and combining this with the development of the peaceful uses of atomic weapons. This failed utterly and the result was that the arms race continued, became hotter and hotter. The Cold War became hotter and hotter as time went on.

And there were various proposals to see what direction one can do to slow down this arms race. President Eisenhower made a proposal before the United Nations that we have some central deposit of fissionable material where the nations could give certain amounts

which would be taken out of what they had and this to be used for peaceful purposes. The general idea was to divert this material from the weapons. It produced a very favorable impression at that time in the newspapers all over the world and then in a few months later, it was forgotten.

Well, I felt this was a very interesting proposal, not very practical but since it had received great recognition, we should carry on. And what we did, I did and my friends, we conceived with the idea of having a conference

on the peaceful uses of atomic energy where you could get the nations of the world to get together and to talk about what they had and what they knew about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Well, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as you know, are not so terribly separated from the military uses

because the peaceful uses of atomic energy means that you have to use fissionable material and make fissionable material in amounts which could be very large. But in any event, a conference devoted to this direction and there in the midst

of the Cold War and the arms race to talk about the peaceful uses seemed to be a wonderful opportunity for a change of pace. The big problem was how to get this to come about. Well, it was very, very difficult because naturally, intelligent people were very skeptical about this sort of thing.

But by going around and persuading, we finally received a certain amount of agreement. To set this up, I thought we should be representative of the nations of the world. So we tried to get a geographical distribution

and something which took a certain amount of weight of the state of advancement of the country in atomic energy. We set up an international committee to begin with. This was 1954 and consisting of the USSR,

the United States, the United Kingdom, France, India, Brazil, you can see we're going from continent to continent. Well, there were seven altogether. Canada was another one. Canada was, although a small country, was in because of their great deposits of uranium which they had.

Well, this committee met. It was very fascinating. The Baba, a great Indian scientist. Unfortunately, there's Sir John Cockroft. I hate to recite the names because so many of them are gone. And it's when I first had a direct political

international experience of this sort. This conference, we decided, must be non-political. A scientific conference, non-political. So we had to set up certain rules of procedure of how to pursue this. There were 22 rules of procedure. It took eight days of negotiation

for the 22 simple rules of procedure. At the end of that time, I became an experienced diplomat in international conferences. Those of you who've had experience in dealing with the Soviet delegation in something as political as this will appreciate it.

But if you haven't, you're very difficult to appreciate it. You get suggested change in text, purely change in text, and then you analyze it and then you find there was a great deal more to it. Well, it took a long time, let's say, eight days to do this. And then to set up the conference itself

which had something like 30 sessions with a lot of different papers only took two days. When we got down to the science as such, away from the politics, it was all very easy which shows me that international relations would be much simpler if scientists would give them

the job and if they take the time to do it. I must say this for the Soviet delegation at the actual conference. They were completely loyal to the rules. There was no attempt at the propaganda. Once we'd worked the thing out, there was no difficulty. Now this conference was perhaps the most important

diplomatic event in the decade of the 50s. And there for the first time, you had a massive Soviet delegation and important delegations from other countries. But for the first time, we met Soviet scientists and others, the official, in considerable numbers.

And the result was most astonishing. It was the most friendly kind of meeting. And to show you the feeling which they had, I will quote to you from a broadcast which was made from the Soviet Union

and it was beamed to Hungary. And the man who was speaking was none other than academician Vexler who was the inventor of the Russian inventor of their cosmetron.

Now this was an internal broadcast amongst the Soviet states. Oh dear, I'm having a little difficulty in finding it. Here it is. Now this is an intercept by an American listening station of a broadcast from Russia to Hungary by Vexler.

And it describes the conference better than I could. The International Scientific Conference called in Geneva to deliberate on the peaceful uses of atomic energy was not only the first truly great international conference in the field of physics. We certainly can claim as regards scope and significance

there was a conference of scientists unique in history. The figures characterizing this conference, the scientists of 73 countries have been published on several occasions. I do not wish to engage in repetition. Not only physicists, research workers, and theoreticians went to Geneva, but also biologists, scientists of chemistry, medicine,

and eminent engineers and technicians. The circle of topics discussed was therefore very wide. Yet it centered on one principle problem, how to turn the vast source of energy like the nucleus of the atom more quickly

and more productively to the benefit of mankind. It was of paramount importance that at the great conference an atmosphere was created which was at once friendly, free from superfluous officiousness, and characterized by objectivity worthy of such a serious scientific gathering. The debates were not confined to sessions

of the special groups. In my opinion, very fruitful conversations were held in the lobbies and in private within the narrow circles of experts from various countries. At the conference sessions, the debates were very active and friendly in tone, which however did not preclude critical observations. It has been noted with satisfaction

that the scientists of the world easily found a common language, and the significance of this fact is inestimable. The participants of the conference paid constant and great attention to the contributions of the Soviet delegates. In the course of our conversations, my foreign colleagues repeatedly declared

how impressed they were by the new data concerning the construction in the USSR of the vast accelerator of charged particles, which is nearing completion, and is intended for the production of protons in the 10 billion electron volt energy. The press on several occasions reported on the foreign scientists' appreciation

of the Soviets' scientific and technical achievements in the peaceful application of atomic energy. While noting with satisfaction the recognition accorded Soviet scientists at the Geneva conference, and here's the interesting thing, I by no means wish to claim

that the contributions of the scientists of other countries or their exhibitions were less significant or interesting than ours. On the contrary, they were most successful. The value of the conference lay precisely in that it fostered the enrichment of knowledge on both sides in theory as well as in the field of experiment

and technical practice. The vast scope of the conference, the variety of its subjects, and the multitude of the contributions heard there make it possible to present an exhaustive survey of even the most interesting parts. Thus I speak of the subject nearest to me,

the accelerators of charged particles. I want first and foremost to point out the outstanding report presented by Ernest Lawrence, the eminent U.S. expert on high-energy accelerators, a new trend in this field. Our scientists and engineers were unanimous in their praise of the report of the U.S. scientist,

Dr. Zinn, on the boiling water reactor. Although various critical observations were made with regard to its application, my Soviet colleagues have valued that report highly, together with many others. Most noteworthy were the exhibitions staged by the Western countries

and the U.S. exhibition in particular. To sum up, there were many most valuable and interesting things for all experts. The material of the conference was worthy of the greatest study. I won't go on with it. Altogether, I consider this Geneva Conference a tremendous success. It opened up splendid perspectives to the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

The conference stood at the center of world attention. It strengthened the atmosphere of mutual understanding and goodwill born in every country following the Four Power Conference. The official support and the messages addressed to the conference by the leaders and so on. Now, does this sound like Cold War propaganda?

And there it was, right in the midst of the Cold War. I can assure you it was most difficult, if not impossible, to make some of our leaders, and I suppose on both sides of the Iron Curtain at that time, appreciate the fact that there was enormous goodwill within the socialist countries,

what was regarded as the enemy, as well as within our own country. And at that very time, this conference, which was such an important political event of bringing people together around this important subject, was a great success. And then when I came back after the conference

and said we've had an enormous success with this, what do you propose to do? What lessons have you learned from this conference? How would you go further? And there was no answer. The governments were not prepared, either the US government or the Soviet government or the UK or other, were not prepared

to build on as great a success as this conference was. Of course, it remained a landmark, and there were successive conferences. Now, to come a bit closer to my theme rather than recounting this, what made it successful? It did lay a certain foundation. The world afterward was not the same as it was before.

We in the United States, in order to make a showing at the conference, had declassified a great deal of important material, and the same was true in the Soviet Union. So we were a much more open world. The directions lay in there,

and most important of the thing was that it was a conference of governments, where governments had to contribute, where the sums that were spent had to go through the normal processes of the treasury, of the governments, the cabinet, and this sort of thing. And so this is essentially the basic theme

of what I'm going to talk about, not just the interaction of individuals, one or two people or a dozen traveling and getting to know somebody else, but it's the use of science to bring governments into closer interaction. Clearly, if governments are in close interaction,

such as the United States is with Germany, science is there anyway. It won't have very much additional influence. But when you are in a situation where there is practically no contact, then the extra amount which can be brought about through science and through the value of science

means a great deal. I'll come to another theme in which I've been interested, but again along the same lines. And this was at the UNESCO conference in Florence in 1950, where I was a member of the American delegation.

UNESCO at that time, and still is, was a very strange organization. It was mostly devoted to literature, the arts, things of that sort, and science was in there just for completeness, I guess.

And the meetings and the delegations of our U.S. delegation, the other delegations were mostly people of that kind. It was a great concession to have a scientist to be a member of the delegation. Well, I thought most of the proposals

which were made, certainly by our delegation, were rather off the point and rather silly, and none which had real meat. Some of it concerned education, and really elementary education. Now it would be obvious to any thinking person that no country is going to allow

an international organization to have a great deal to say about their education of their young people. They want to make their young people their nationals and not international. So to give this some bite and to have some kind of monument,

something tangible, I proposed at that time, I made a proposal in a very diffident way for an organization to be set up which would, in some respects, be like the organization we already had in the United States at Brookhaven,

some organization which allow the countries to contribute to build a scientific instrument, an accelerator in this case, which would enable the American scientists to, the European scientists, to have facilities approaching those

which the American scientists had. This was an outrageous proposal at the time, although it's so well realized, and one had to, I had to convert myself to be a politician to try to persuade various delegations to support this.

I think the greatest asset I had was my lack of knowledge of French. Because I could go to the members of various delegations. I discovered there that French was just as important as English in these international conferences and tell them, now look, if you think this is a good idea and I can't talk to these people,

my French is non-existent, won't you talk to them? I got a wonderful Swiss to work on this and all over. And of course there was Professor Auger who was in NATO. And I even persuaded the British delegation to vote for it. In any event, the resolution passed.

And the result of that resolution and the terrific efforts of Professor Auger in UNESCO was the establishment of the laboratory at Geneva, CERN. Now, again, along the line which I mean, this is a great laboratory.

It is devoted to high energy physics. It is supported by governments through their treasuries. In other words, on sound political foundation, sound governmental foundation. There is a governmental treaty on this. And the sums it spent are large enough

so the governments have to think about it. There is a relation between governments. Its greatest characteristic, I think, which comes closest to our theme is the fact that it's a laboratory of pure science. I was asked once whether they should make a reactor.

I said, for God's sake, stay away from anything practical. That would destroy the organization because you then begin to come into the national competition of business. Do it for pure science. And it's pure science which has the actual appeal to the imagination of people.

The present revulsion which exists is against science is this confusion. The misapplication of technology is one thing. Pure science for ennobling and enlarging human horizons is something else again. I regard this as a tremendous success and has done a great deal

to bring the European countries together. And I'm proud of the fact that this was built without a cent of American money. I could have gotten the money for it, but it would have spoiled the ganze Stimmung.

And it's a going concern. Now there's one other thing which is perhaps more difficult to talk about and more misunderstanding exists than anything else, but is of tremendous actuality and perhaps if the idea is followed out, a very great promise for the future.

I'll give a little bit of the history. We were very happily pursuing the Cold War when in 1957 there was the dramatic announcement of the first Sputnik, first Russian satellite. This produced an enormous effect all over the world

and particularly in the United States that the socialist, the Russians were the first to put up such a thing. And the general feeling was that we had vastly underestimated the Russians and instead of regarding Russian capabilities rather lightly,

suddenly they became 12 foot Russians, four meter Russians. What to do to encounter this enormous force? One had the same depressing feeling when this was announced as you read every day, I mean for Americans, as you read every day of the fall of the dollar. Suddenly there's a very great revolution.

I happen to be at that time the chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee and we called in by President Eisenhower, what do you advise, what to do in this situation? Because people described the Russian system of education and technical education as being so wonderful.

An enormous number of scientists, they made how well educated they were and so on and that this race was such that we would be left enormously behind. Well, one thing we learned during the war that two people cooperating results in not just twice as much

but almost more nearly four times as much and sort of n squared effect. I suggested can't we somehow organize for example the NATO countries in such a way that by cooperation we could overcome this difficulty. You can't make two scientists so quickly but if we learn to cooperate in this way

that would help a great deal. That seemed to be a good idea. Such proposals had been made by others but President Eisenhower going to Europe at that time for heads of state put that through and that was organized at that time in the NATO Science Committee.

And the first chairman actually was a well-known American physicist, Norman Ramsey. Well, we very soon discovered that the military certainly didn't care for our help. They were very happy with what they were doing

or if they were unhappy they didn't want us to try to make them happy and get into their affairs and get into their hair to use the expression. So there we had the Science Committee and some funds. Now, what to do for the purpose? Well, it's very clear after you left that off

what had been lacking in the organization of NATO. There are two sides to NATO. One is the military side which is really an organization where the different countries put up the money for their own military installations. There's no NATO money in that.

It's national. Then there's a certain small sum of money for the NATO organization which NATO means the North Atlantic Treaty. When this was set up it was meant to be a military organization. One side a cultural organization on the other side to bring the NATO countries

in closer agreement culturally, spiritually and otherwise. This second side had been forgotten but which we in the NATO Science Committee revived and we set up a system of NATO fellowships for advanced people

and paying well for people to go from one NATO country to study in another NATO country. Now, when we looked into it at that time there was a tremendous number of relationships between the United States and every one of the NATO countries but on the other hand there were very few cases

of Germans going to France or Frenchmen coming to Germany. They crossed the lines. These fellowships made an enormous difference with respect to that and that's operating to this day and nowadays they're more important than ever because the national fellowships have gone down a number.

Then we had a system of research sums to facilitate cooperative research of scientists from one NATO country with the scientists of another NATO country. And lastly was a system of summer institutes

schools which may go on from a few weeks to a much longer period on elevated subjects, important subjects of science in all ranges. These schools have proved to be of tremendous importance for the level of world science.

When they were first set up most of the lecturers were Americans and the audience were mostly people from the NATO countries and other people from the NATO countries. I've been to a number of them and the situation has now very much changed

and you'll find that most of the lecturers are from the NATO countries. The whole level has gone up enormously. These schools worked in a very serious way. When I attended last year people start at nine o'clock in the morning and sometimes won't finish till 11 o'clock at night to time off for meals and swimming, things of that sort.

So here you have a real interaction and I think that between CERN and some of these schools it had a not, and NATO in general, had a not inconsiderable effect in building up the general importance of the European community.

And here I've run into a fantastic problem which is very discouraging as far as I'm concerned. I think this invention of the NATO Science Committee, of these fellowships, these schools, this cooperative research in that sense

was a very positive thing. But to my astonishment, the young people, the younger people who come to these schools, especially those from Europe, and of somewhat say leftist tendencies are tremendously opposed to this. And I've not yet been able to find out why.

We've had enormous struggles. It turned out that they were in favor of the school but they didn't like the label NATO which they bitterly resented because they didn't want to receive money from a military organization.

But the money which they received came from their governments, not from a military organization. The money did not come through the, let's say, the Department of Defense or something of that sort. It came from their government. But because it was labeled NATO, they were against it and felt in some places

made demonstrations to make the school impossible. These were physicists. And this has astonished me. Maybe the young people here, they will explain to me later in the afternoon that a label put on subject where you don't look at the text, you look at the title of the chapter, could be so confusing.

And they say, why can't some other organization give this money? Well, certainly another organization could, but what is the other organization to be? Are you going to go into every one of these countries and persuade them and raise the question all over again where the question could be raised,

such as Herr Empke did? What is the use of this thing? Here it is. It's doing a good work. And I felt somehow or other that there was a subordination of the actual object itself to the label under which it marched.

I no longer believe, as I did at the beginning, that if you gave the scientists more of an opportunity to run world affairs, that they would be more objective, more reasonable, more understanding, could separate the significant from the insignificant,

which I thought we had taught them in school, in graduate school. When you teach a subject, what is important, what isn't? How do you take care of order of magnitudes? What is your objective in the end? This I thought would carry over, and these people could become important citizens of their community.

And through the universal quality of science, keep in some way pressing to make this a better world. Now I believe in it much less than I did before. But maybe we'll be able to persuade them. Maybe we'll be able to change the label,

paste something over this. But I, for one, believe in confrontation. When something is unclear, you want to not compromise it because the situation remains as it before. I'd like to confront this with the fact, to make it clear.

And to put this at its darkest, I have suggested to members of the academy, the Soviet Union, and then Czechoslovakia, and then Hungary, and then Poland, that we extend this idea and utilize this marvelous cooperation

between scientists, as shown by the NATO fellowships, by the various cooperative elements, and these summer institutes to make contact with the socialist countries. They have an organization, I don't know its details, it's the Warsaw Pact. If we could confront these

and turn it into something which would be positive, so that in that case, too, there would be a cooperation with the socialist countries, not just having people in the socialist countries visit the summer institutes, they come there. But to have their governments actually contribute

to the support of this thing, to make an actual contact which works through the governments, through an instrumentality, utilizing the attraction of the scientific spirit, scientific advance, and the whole idea, the universality of science, to help through this,

to bring one more strand to make one world in the direction of one world out of this. Here again, I have encountered skepticism, which is natural, which I expected to encounter. But I do think there is value to the idea.

If we could press on with this, and I hope others of you who have such contacts would, in your own governments, on talks with scientists and officials from the socialist countries, press on in this direction so as to begin to make an organization

which has the blessings of the government and really cooperates. It is very unfortunate that many of these things, the people from the socialist countries, the socialist countries refuse to cooperate. The value of having an organization where the governments cooperate

is that a person going from, let's say, a socialist country, and going to one of these laboratories or to accepting one of these fellowships and so on, in a sense has never left home because his own country is contributing. It's in this sense that I'd like to see it go.

I would like to see further efforts of this sort for, let's say, a European university or an extended European university or a world university, but it'd have to be not just a place where one teaches, but also when issued certificates so that when a student goes there,

supported by the government, again, he is never left home in that sense, and he would get a certificate or something which would be universal for the different countries and in this various way to nibble away at the barriers between the different countries.

It's in that sense I meant to use science, which is so universally respected, at least people think about it, as a means, as a solid means of bringing closer relations between countries.

Now, here we're hindered vastly, and we have greatly departed from an ideal which existed in the past. I've always believed in looking for the future fulfillment and not of a golden age of the past, but let me read two things to you to show what was in the past

and what we hope to work for in the future. Two examples. The first one is from the history of the United States itself, and this was during the course of our Revolutionary War

when the United States had not yet been formed as the United States, but with war with England. On March the 10th, 1779, Benjamin Franklin, who was in the government, addressed a document which reads in part, to all captains and commanders of armed ships

acting by commission from the Congress of the United States of America, now at war with Great Britain. Gentlemen, a ship having been fitted out from England before the commencement of this war to make discoveries in unknown seas under the conduct

of that most celebrated navigator and discoverer, Captain Cook. An undertaking clearly laudable in itself as the increase of geographical knowledge facilitates the communication between distant nations and in the exchange of useful products and manufacturers and the extension of arts

whereby the common enjoyments of human life are multiplied and augmented and science of other kinds increased to the benefit of mankind in general. This is to recommend to you that in case the said ship should happen to fall into your hands, you would not consider her as an enemy

nor suffer any plunder to be made of the effects contained in her nor obstruct her immediate return to England. And the recognition of Franklin's service, Captain Cook's expedition, when the gold medal struck in honor of Captain Cook was presented to Franklin. Now you will recall that Franklin,

in addition to being a great scientist, was also a great statesman and perhaps the greatest diplomat the United States ever had. There's another incident. Can you imagine this happened recently? In October 1813, Sir Humphry Davy obtained permission from Napoleon

to pass through France for a tour of the continent with Lady Davy and the latter's maid, Mr. Michael Faraday. They arrived in Paris on October 1927 and on November 2nd, he attended a meeting of the first class of the Institute of France.

On December 3rd, 13th, 1913, he was elected with practical unanimity as a corresponding member of the first class of the institute. You can see how far we have degenerated in our government's head in respect for the intellect,

in respect for science. So this is a part of the problem for all of us, how to overcome these handicaps which the rise of nationalism has put in the way of the development of science

and of the development of a world community in science. There are these enormous areas, enormous populations of the world of very gifted people where communication is very difficult. I refer to the socialist countries. I refer to China.

There's the two great exceptions and we have to press on and look to utilize whatever we can of the attractiveness and the power of science to bring these two vast countries into a greater communication

and a greater cultural or other unity with the rest of us. In these two cases, science can be a very great utility. At the time after this conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy, which was made under the aegis

of the United Nations Science Committee, of which I represent the United States, this committee for a period when the Cold War was at its hottest, this was one of the very few connections which we had with people from the Soviet Union. The other one perhaps may be the Pugwash Conference

where it happened to be supported by the Soviet government and people who were delegates to that conference then could go home and describe in the conference and could tell of what had happened and say things for which they would have put in jail otherwise. This is the sense, which I mean the importance

of making such organizations. Now I hope that in the future, which belongs to the people not here in front but in back, the students, that you will try to carry forward in these directions, that to realize basically

that science is not a profession, it's not a technique, it's much more than that, it's a great discovery of the human spirit, that it's universal, and then must use this basic concept of the universality to approach the various varieties of cultures which exist

because I think it will turn out that science will be the highest culture of all when properly understood and the greatest expression of the human spirit. And perhaps we can develop it in such a direction

that to misuse science in one way or the other when properly understood will come to be regarded as a sin, a sin actually in the religious sense and perhaps punishable as such in one way or another. We have no other form

that's common to humanity, no culture common to humanity, which would serve to develop a goal for human cultural evolution that's comparable to science and I feel we must use it in all its facets. Thank you.